Absurdity Experience Explained

https://chatgpt.com/share/67df17e6-9e3c-8012-b2ed-54655c3c6c12

Chat history

What is the absurdity experience?

ChatGPT said:

Reasoned about absurdity experience for 4 seconds

In existential and literary contexts—particularly in the work of Albert Camus—the “absurdity experience” (often simply called “the Absurd”) refers to the unsettling realization or feeling that arises from the clash between our innate human desire for order, clarity, or meaning and the apparent indifference or “silence” of the universe. This sense of dislocation or confusion emerges when we recognize that our search for inherent purpose seems out of step with a world that does not readily yield it.

Here are a few points and references often cited when discussing the absurdity experience:

1. Albert Camus and The Myth of Sisyphus (1942)

   • Camus is well known for defining the Absurd as the contradiction between our longing for meaning and the world’s lack of it.

   • In The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus illustrates his concept using the Greek mythological figure condemned to roll a boulder up a hill, only for it to roll down again repeatedly. The ceaseless, pointless labor is a potent symbol for the experience of absurdity.

2. Confronting Absurdity

   • Camus argues that absurdity is not purely in the external world nor purely in our minds—it emerges at the moment of confrontation between the two.

   • The “absurd mood” or absurd experience is often triggered by moments of sudden clarity when ordinary routines seem stripped of their usual meaning or continuity. A mundane scene can abruptly appear strange and purposeless.

3. Existentialist and Phenomenological Influences

   • Although Camus did not consider himself an existentialist, the theme of absurdity resonates with ideas found in other existential writers—most notably Jean-Paul Sartre (e.g., Nausea, 1938) and Søren Kierkegaard (who wrestled with the “leap of faith” in a seemingly paradoxical existence).

   • These thinkers likewise explore what it feels like for humans to confront a world that does not inherently cater to our sense-making impulses.

4. Responses to Absurdity

   • While the initial absurd feeling can inspire despair, Camus famously posits a kind of “defiance” or acceptance without resignation. In other words, a person can acknowledge the absurd while continuing to search for or create value on their own terms.

   • This attitude differentiates Camus’s perspective from both nihilism (which might declare there is no meaning, full stop) and existential philosophies that seek meaning in subjective choice or a transcendent leap.

5. Verifying the Phenomenon

   • Philosophers and psychologists alike have noted that the “absurdity experience” can arise spontaneously in everyday life (e.g., suddenly feeling one’s daily routines lack purpose). You will find contemporary discussions in existential psychology (Viktor Frankl’s Man’s Search for Meaning alludes to an individual’s confrontation with meaninglessness) and in more general philosophical texts on human finitude and contingency.

In short, the “absurdity experience” is an intense subjective realization—an emotional and intellectual shock—that arises from noticing that our heartfelt quest for objective meaning appears to go unmet in an indifferent world. The term is deeply associated with Camus’s exploration of the Absurd in The Myth of Sisyphus, but other existential and phenomenological writers also discuss and elaborate on this unsettling yet potentially transformative encounter.

o1

You said:

Why do we keep on expecting decency even from the people who have repeated shown us that they are incapable of being decent?

ChatGPT said:

Reasoned about expectations of decency for 7 seconds

The tendency to expect decency from individuals who have repeatedly displayed indecent behavior can be approached from several angles—psychological, moral, and existential. Below are some interrelated explanations, along with references that can help substantiate and explore them more deeply.

1. Psychological Roots of Hope and Trust

• Optimism Bias.
  Researchers like Tali Sharot (see her book The Optimism Bias, 2011) have documented a cognitive tendency in humans to overestimate the likelihood of positive outcomes. Even after receiving evidence to the contrary, people often persist in the belief that others can (and will) behave decently.

• Just-World Hypothesis.
  Melvin J. Lerner’s work on the “Just World” phenomenon (The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion, 1980) suggests that humans have a deep-seated need to see the world as orderly and fair. We may keep expecting decency because we want to preserve the sense that good actions are rewarded and bad actions are ultimately rectified.

• Cognitive Dissonance.
  Leon Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance (A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, 1957) might explain why we maintain our expectations of others even in light of repeated disappointments. Acknowledging someone’s indecency forces us to reconcile uncomfortable contradictions—perhaps about our own judgment or prior support—so we cling to hope or rationalizations instead.

2. Existential and Moral Dimensions

• Existential Humanism (Sartre, Camus).
  Jean-Paul Sartre (Existentialism is a Humanism, 1946) and Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus, 1942) discuss human freedom and responsibility, often emphasizing the ways we imbue the world (and people) with expectations. We continue hoping for decency in others partly because it is integral to how we define meaningful relationships. To abandon hope in another’s moral capacity can feel like a step into a more absurd or nihilistic worldview, which we resist.

• Moral Psychology of Virtue and Character.
  Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (4th century BCE) offers the notion that we naturally aspire toward virtue—both in ourselves and in those around us. Even when someone repeatedly acts indecently, we may hold onto the possibility of their improvement because it resonates with the broader human tendency to seek and affirm what is good.

• Kantian Respect for Persons.
  Immanuel Kant (in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 1785) argued that each person should be treated as an end in themselves, never merely as a means. This imperative can manifest as the belief (or hope) that everyone is capable of moral progress and dignity, hence the repeated expectation of decency—even in the face of contrary evidence.

3. Social and Relational Dynamics

• Emotional Investment and Attachment.
  John Bowlby’s attachment theory (e.g., Attachment and Loss, 1969) underscores how deeply we become invested in relationships. Even if someone’s behavior is chronically disappointing, our emotional bonds may cause us to overlook or downplay their transgressions because ending the relationship or radically altering our view of them threatens our sense of stability.

• Group Harmony and Social Cohesion.
  In group settings, we might keep expecting decency to preserve social bonds or avoid conflict. Irving Janis’s “groupthink” theory (Victims of Groupthink, 1972) shows how maintaining group cohesion can overshadow critical assessments of a member’s unethical behavior. We hope for (or pretend) decency rather than confronting unpleasant realities.

• Narrative Identities.
  Psychologist Dan P. McAdams (in The Redemptive Self, 2006) argues that humans construct life stories to make sense of themselves and others. These narratives often include themes of “redemption” or second chances. Thus, even if someone acts indecently, we may expect a turnaround because it fits the redemptive template we’ve adopted about human character.

4. Practical and Existential Consequences

• Protecting One’s Own Moral Framework.
  Admitting that someone is fundamentally indecent—and will remain so—can destabilize our worldview, especially if that person is close to us. Clinging to the expectation of decency preserves coherence in our moral outlook.

• Fear of Cynicism.
  A thoroughgoing skepticism of everyone’s motives can lead to cynicism, which can be psychologically and socially isolating (see Søren Kierkegaard’s discussions of despair in The Sickness Unto Death, 1849). We persist with hopeful expectations to avoid sliding into a bitter worldview where trust becomes impossible.

• Self-Fulfilling Prophecy.
  While not guaranteed, sometimes believing in another’s ability to do better can nudge them in that direction. The concept of the “self-fulfilling prophecy” (Robert K. Merton, 1948) suggests that our expectations can, in certain cases, influence others’ behavior.

Conclusion

We continue expecting decency from chronically indecent people for a complex interplay of psychological, moral, and existential reasons. Cognitive biases like optimism, deep-seated moral beliefs about human potential, the desire to maintain coherent life narratives, and an aversion to the bleakness of total cynicism all bolster our hope. While these expectations can result in repeated disappointment, they also reflect the resilient human impulse to believe in moral possibility—even against the odds.

Further Reading

• Tali Sharot, The Optimism Bias (2011)

• Melvin J. Lerner, The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion (1980)

• Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (1957)

• Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism Is a Humanism (1946)

• Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus (1942)

• Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785)

• John Bowlby, Attachment and Loss (1969)

• Dan P. McAdams, The Redemptive Self (2006)

• Søren Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death (1849)

These texts and theories collectively illuminate the universal human propensity to keep faith in decency, even under trying circumstances—testifying to both our vulnerabilities and our capacity for hope.

o1

You said:

How significant is this irrational behavior, especially in politics?

ChatGPT said:

Reasoned about irrational behavior in politics for 7 seconds

In politics, the tendency to keep expecting decency from those who have repeatedly failed to behave decently can have profound consequences—shaping voter behavior, policy outcomes, and how institutions respond to wrongdoing. While it is in some sense “irrational,” this persistent hope or assumption of good faith is deeply rooted in well-documented psychological and sociological mechanisms. Below are several key ways in which this phenomenon manifests and why it remains so significant in the political arena, with references for further reading.

1. Cognitive Biases and Motivated Reasoning

• Confirmation Bias and Motivated Reasoning
  People often seek out information that reinforces preexisting beliefs while ignoring contradictory data. In politics, supporters of a given figure, party, or ideology overlook “red flags” or indecencies (even repeated ones) to protect their partisan or group identity.

  • Reference: Ziva Kunda, “The Case for Motivated Reasoning” in Psychological Bulletin (1990).

  • Reference: Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, “When Corrections Fail: The persistence of political misperceptions,” Political Behavior (2010).

• Cognitive Dissonance
  As Leon Festinger (in A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, 1957) outlined, facing hard evidence of a politician’s moral failings creates mental discomfort for a loyal constituency; in many cases, it is simpler to rationalize or excuse the failures than to abandon long-standing allegiances.

• Optimism Bias
  Tali Sharot’s The Optimism Bias (2011) suggests that humans naturally lean toward positive expectations. Voters may keep expecting or “projecting” decency onto political figures—even in the face of evidence to the contrary—because acknowledging the contrary can be disheartening or destabilizing.

2. Group Identity and Loyalty

• Partisan Perceptual Screen
  The American Voter (Campbell, Converse, Miller, Stokes, 1960) introduced the idea that partisan identification acts like a “perceptual screen,” influencing how citizens interpret political events. This filter can make it easier to dismiss or reinterpret facts that demonstrate indecent or unethical behavior by “our” side.

• In-Group vs. Out-Group Dynamics
  Jonathan Haidt, in The Righteous Mind (2012), describes how moral and political judgments are often driven by intuitive group loyalties rather than rational deliberation. Many voters continue to hope their chosen leaders will uphold decency precisely because that leader is a champion of their in-group, making the cost of admitting betrayal or indecency very high.

• Social Identity Theory
  Henri Tajfel and John Turner’s Social Identity Theory (1979) shows that belonging to a group (political party, movement, or ideology) is central to one’s self-concept. When a political figure embodies that group identity, members remain loyal—even if the figure fails morally—because rejecting the figure feels like rejecting the self or community.

3. Emotional and Symbolic Dimensions

• Emotional Investment in Charismatic Leaders
  Max Weber’s concept of “charismatic authority” (Economy and Society, 1922) highlights how personal devotion to a leader can override evidence of wrongdoing. The emotional bond fosters persistent hope that the leader will eventually act in line with the idealized image.

• Narrative and Redemption Themes
  In Dan P. McAdams’s The Redemptive Self (2006), he discusses how people construct narratives of moral redemption. Politicians often position themselves (or are seen) as figures who can overcome flaws or past misdeeds. This storyline resonates deeply with a public that wants to believe people can change.

4. Institutional and Structural Factors

• Electoral Systems and Incumbency Advantage
  Structural factors—like incumbency advantage in many electoral systems—can keep ineffective or indecent officials in office. Voters will continue to “hope” for decency because viable alternatives are scarce, or because the system makes ousting incumbents difficult.

  • Reference: Morris P. Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections (1981).

• Echo Chambers and Polarized Media
  As Cass Sunstein notes in #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media (2017), the rise of echo chambers amplifies partisan loyalty and can limit exposure to critical viewpoints. These media silos can continually reinforce a positive image of a political figure, renewing people’s faith in their decency.

• Political Marketing and Spin
  Sophisticated campaign strategies and “spin” operations can obscure or downplay a politician’s indecency, feeding into the public’s underlying hope. Drew Westen’s The Political Brain (2007) examines how emotional messaging can override rational assessments, leading voters to expect moral integrity despite repeated signs of corruption or unethical conduct.

5. Consequences and Significance

1. Entrenchment of Corruption
   Persistently expecting decency from corrupt or indecent officials can allow unethical practices to become normalized or go unchecked.

2. Erosion of Accountability
   Politicians who count on the electorate’s forgiveness or optimism may continue to breach ethical boundaries, knowing that deep-seated psychological tendencies often insulate them from severe consequences.

3. Polarization and Cynicism
   Ironically, repeated disappointments can increase societal cynicism. Yet partisan camps may double down on “their side,” deepening political divisions rather than resolving them.

4. Stagnation of Reform
   When the public continually invests hope in flawed leadership, momentum for genuine policy reform and systemic checks diminishes. It becomes harder to galvanize collective action to hold people accountable when faith in their latent decency lingers.

Final Thoughts

In sum, the “irrational” impulse to keep expecting decency from chronically indecent political figures is not mere naïveté—it arises from well-researched psychological biases (e.g., cognitive dissonance, motivated reasoning), deep-seated group loyalties, and the structural features of political institutions. Its significance in politics is enormous, influencing everything from how voters make choices at the ballot box to whether officials are meaningfully held accountable. Understanding the interplay of these forces—and referencing works such as those by Leon Festinger, Brendan Nyhan, Tali Sharot, Jonathan Haidt, and Cass Sunstein—helps clarify why we so often expect (and keep hoping for) decency, even in the face of consistent evidence to the contrary.

o1

You said:

Can this "absurd" tendency in voters doom democracy?

ChatGPT said:

Reasoned about absurdity and democracy's resilience for 11 seconds

The fear that an “absurd” (or irrationally hopeful) tendency in voters could ultimately erode or “doom” democracy arises from the concern that chronically indecent political actors may stay in power if citizens keep expecting them to behave decently—even after they have repeatedly proven otherwise. Below is an overview of how and why this phenomenon poses risks to democratic governance, with references for deeper exploration.

1. The Core Problem: Lack of Accountability

a. Tolerance of Corruption and Abuse

• If large segments of the electorate routinely ignore or forgive blatant unethical conduct, politicians may calculate that there is little cost to acting indecently.

• Over time, unaccountable governance can foster a culture where corruption becomes normalized, undermining democratic institutions that rely on the rule of law and transparency.

b. Possible Descent into Authoritarian Practices

• A leader who senses impunity might dismantle checks and balances—such as an independent judiciary, free press, or impartial electoral bodies—to consolidate power.

• Historical examples (e.g., the rise of authoritarian regimes in the early 20th century) show that populations often disregard early warning signs, holding onto the hope that a “strong leader” will eventually do the right thing.

Reference:

• Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), for an exploration of how a disengaged or overly trusting populace can enable the rise of authoritarian regimes.

• Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (2018), examining how democratic erosion can occur gradually via elected officials undermining institutions.

2. Democratic Theory and the Role of the Electorate

a. Plato’s Critique of Democracy

• In The Republic, Plato worries that a populace swayed by charisma and rhetoric (rather than reason) can be seduced by demagogues—leaders who appeal to base instincts or make impossible promises.

• While Plato’s critique is ancient, modern parallels exist where emotional appeals overshadow rational scrutiny of a candidate’s moral character.

b. Tocqueville and the “Tyranny of the Majority”

• Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (1835/1840) highlights the danger that majority opinion can become tyrannical if critical dissent and moral vigilance are lost.

• If voters adhere blindly to a party or charismatic figure, those in the minority or who question authority may be silenced or sidelined, corroding healthy pluralism.

c. John Stuart Mill’s Emphasis on Critical Inquiry

• Mill’s work, particularly On Liberty (1859), stresses the importance of open debate and the testing of ideas.

• Persistent belief in the decency of indecent leaders short-circuits the very deliberative processes that Mill believed protect truth and liberty in a democracy.

3. Social and Psychological Mechanisms

a. Groupthink and Echo Chambers

• Irving Janis’s Victims of Groupthink (1972) shows how desire for group cohesion can stifle critical evaluation. In highly partisan contexts, voters may close ranks around indecent politicians to avoid splitting the group.

• Cass Sunstein’s #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media (2017) documents how polarized online spaces can harden these echo chambers, perpetuating one-sided narratives that keep hope in “our side” alive, even when moral lapses abound.

b. Motivated Reasoning and Cognitive Dissonance

• Leon Festinger’s A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (1957) explains how people strive to maintain consistent beliefs, often dismissing contradictory evidence to avoid psychological discomfort.

• In a political context, this can lead voters to excuse misdeeds—even repeated ones—to remain aligned with their party or ideological identity.

c. Myth of Redemption and Emotional Investments

• The concept of a “redemptive arc” is embedded in many cultural narratives (see Dan P. McAdams, The Redemptive Self, 2006). Voters often invest emotionally in a politician and cling to the belief that “they’ll do the right thing eventually,” a belief that indecent leaders can exploit.

4. Does This Doom Democracy?

a. Erosion vs. Total Collapse

• Democracies rarely collapse overnight; they tend to erode incrementally—through sustained attacks on independent institutions, free press, and fair elections.

• An electorate that clings to hope in flawed leadership, despite clear evidence of moral or legal transgressions, contributes to this erosion because it reduces the likelihood of concerted corrective action.

b. Countervailing Forces

• Institutions like a robust civil society, independent judiciary, active press, and well-organized opposition can serve as bulwarks against the full collapse of democratic governance.

• Even if voters exhibit “absurd” loyalty, democracy can be preserved if these institutional and civic checks remain strong.

c. The Role of Active Citizenry

• Democracy thrives when citizens stay informed, practice critical scrutiny, and demand accountability.

• Moments of disillusionment (when the “absurd hope” finally breaks) can galvanize reform movements or bring about new political coalitions—reinforcing democratic ideals rather than ending them.

Conclusion

While the persistent, perhaps irrational, willingness of voters to expect decency from chronically indecent politicians can severely undermine democratic norms and create fertile ground for authoritarian tendencies, it does not necessarily “doom” democracy outright. Much depends on the interplay of institutional safeguards, civic engagement, and the strength of countervailing social movements.

In other words, the “absurd” tendency is a significant threat because it erodes oversight and accountability—a key pillar of democratic health. However, democracy has proven resilient in many contexts when people, institutions, and civic actors mobilize to defend foundational values. Whether that resilience prevails ultimately hinges on citizens’ capacity (and willingness) to break free from irrational hopes and demand responsible leadership.

Further Reading

• Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951)

• Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (2018)

• Plato, The Republic (~375 BCE)

• Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1835/1840)

• John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859)

• Irving Janis, Victims of Groupthink (1972)

• Cass Sunstein, #Republic (2017)

• Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (1957)

• Dan P. McAdams, The Redemptive Self (2006)

By exploring these works, one can see how the social, psychological, and philosophical underpinnings of “absurd” voter behavior can contribute to democratic backsliding—yet also discover how institutional and civic resources can mitigate or reverse that process.

0/2

o1

You said:

Unfortunately this "absurd" tendency can be pervasive in all social interactions, including in family dynamics. It can be empowering or enabling the worst of us endlessly. We probably need much more radical approach to this problem than you might be suggesting.

ChatGPT said:

Reasoned for 4 seconds

A more radical approach to the “absurd” tendency of continually expecting decency—whether in politics, social interactions, or family life—would involve confronting not just individual lapses or biases but the deeper structures, narratives, and relational dynamics that give rise to this pattern in the first place. Such an approach aims to tackle the root causes (psychological, social, or even metaphysical) that sustain the habit of clinging to hope long after it has proven unwarranted. Below are a few lines of thought that push beyond the more incremental, reformist approaches:

1. Radical Honesty and Boundary-Setting

a. Individuation and “No Contact” Strategies

• In family systems, a genuinely radical approach might be making a clear break with individuals or environments that repeatedly demonstrate harmful behavior.

• This could mean going “no contact” with toxic relatives or cutting off emotional entanglements that enable the cycle of disappointment. Psychologically, the process of “individuation” (Carl Jung’s term) can involve stepping away from inherited family myths and expectations, thereby dismantling illusions of inevitable decency.

b. Confronting Avoidance and Denial

• In The Body Keeps the Score (2014), Bessel van der Kolk discusses how trauma lingers not just in the mind but also in the body; “radical honesty” about repeated harm (and the repeated hope that the harm will cease) can be an essential step in breaking entrenched cycles.

• Some family therapists (e.g., Salvador Minuchin’s structural family therapy, Murray Bowen’s family systems theory) emphasize setting clear boundaries and “unhooking” from manipulative dynamics. While these approaches can seem drastic—“cut off,” “unhook,” “upend the hierarchy”—they are often what genuinely disrupts the perpetual hope-indecency loop.

2. Systemic and Structural Reordering

a. Dismantling Enabling Frameworks

• Beyond individual boundaries, a radical approach may require challenging social, religious, or cultural narratives that perpetuate the idea that certain figures or groups are by definition trustworthy.

• Michel Foucault’s analyses of power (Discipline and Punish, 1975) reveal how structures (e.g., institutions, discourses of morality) normalize obedience and discourage critical examination. A “radical break” would mean actively questioning and reconfiguring these power relations—rather than merely hoping for more decency from those in power.

b. Transvaluation of Values (Nietzsche)

• In On the Genealogy of Morality (1887), Friedrich Nietzsche argues for a “transvaluation of values”—overturning moral frameworks that perpetuate submission and false hope. Instead of waiting for virtue in a system that repeatedly fails, Nietzschean radicalism might reject the very structures that define “virtue” in a self-serving way.

• This approach can be extreme: it might involve political or cultural revolutions that overthrow existing moral codes in favor of new, more life-affirming ones (though critics warn that tearing down old frameworks without building ethically robust alternatives can lead to chaos).

3. Psychoanalytic and Existential ‘Exposure’

a. “Pushing Illusions to Their Limit”

• Certain strains of psychoanalytic theory (e.g., Jacques Lacan, Slavoj Žižek) suggest that illusions sometimes must be “pushed to their breaking point” to reveal the Real—that is, to force a confrontation with the fundamental lack or emptiness we try to avoid.

• In a family or social setting, this might mean no longer quietly enabling indecent behavior with polite excuses. Instead, it entails consistent, unflinching confrontation of the gap between what we want (decency) and what is shown (indecency)—a confrontation that, while painful, can force a structural reevaluation of relationships.

b. Existential “Revolt”

• Albert Camus, in The Rebel (1951), expands on the notion of revolt (introduced in The Myth of Sisyphus) as an active stance of defiance against oppressive conditions. While this doesn’t necessarily guarantee change in others’ behavior, the refusal to participate in illusions can be transformative for the individual—and can (in some cases) galvanize broader revolt in social or political systems.

4. Moral and Philosophical “Clean Breaks”

a. Ethical Exits and “Counter-Institutions”

• Some thinkers propose establishing parallel communities or “counter-institutions” that embody radically different values—free from the cycles of denial and hope that saturate the mainstream.

• Intentional communities, mutual aid networks, or activist groups that embrace strict accountability can be seen as attempts to construct moral enclaves where decency is non-negotiable and illusions are kept in check through communal vigilance.

b. Fanon and De-Colonizing the Mind

• Frantz Fanon (Black Skin, White Masks, 1952; The Wretched of the Earth, 1961) calls for decolonizing not only political structures but also the psyche. His radical approach involves rooting out the internalized myths that perpetuate oppressive dynamics.

• In a more general sense (beyond colonial contexts), this resonates with the need to decolonize the mind from all illusions that sustain hope in systems or relationships that repeatedly exhibit indecency.

5. Balancing Destruction and Creation

A truly radical response is always double-edged: on one hand, it demolishes enabling illusions and the structures that support them; on the other, it must offer a constructive way forward—otherwise it risks leaving a vacuum that can be filled by something equally harmful.

1. Destructive Element:

   • Refusal to continue “playing the game.”

   • Ending relationships or severing ties.

   • Challenging or dismantling institutions that perpetuate false hopes.

2. Creative Element:

   • Building new relationships, communities, or institutions founded on explicit accountability and transparency.

   • Supporting mental health interventions that help individuals face painful truths without collapsing into despair.

   • Re-envisioning moral, cultural, or spiritual frameworks that do not rely on passive trust in “decency” but rather on active co-creation of an ethical environment.

Conclusion

The “absurd” phenomenon of continually expecting decency where there is none can become deeply destructive when it permeates families, communities, and entire societies. A radical approach, therefore, demands more than incremental changes or polite admonitions: it calls for the possibility of total rupture—cutting ties, reshaping social structures, or fundamentally overhauling the moral frameworks that keep individuals and groups locked into naive hope.

Such an approach is not without risk: confronting entrenched systems of family, social, or political power often provokes resistance, and radical ruptures can be personally and collectively painful. Yet, for those convinced that the cycle of expecting decency “endlessly” enables the worst among us, these more drastic measures may be the only way to break free from illusions and reclaim authentic agency.

Further Reading for Radical Perspectives

• Carl Jung, The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious (1969), for ideas on individuation and breaking from inherited family narratives.

• Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (1975), for a study of how power and disciplinary systems perpetuate docility.

• Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality (1887), for the concept of transvaluation of values.

• Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (1989), for insights on how illusions and ideology can maintain harmful structures.

• Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (1961), for radical decolonization of mind and society.

• Salvador Minuchin, Families and Family Therapy (1974), for structural interventions that force dysfunctional family systems to reorganize.

• Albert Camus, The Rebel (1951), for an existential call to revolt against oppressive conditions rather than expecting them to improve.

Taking these thinkers and methodologies seriously often means embracing radical honesty, severing ties where necessary, and challenging entrenched institutions—actions that can be jarring but are sometimes the only means to break the cycle of endlessly expecting decency from those who repeatedly demonstrate its absence.

o1

You said:

What happened to the traditional taboo system that might be useful in this respect?

ChatGPT said:

Reasoned for 8 seconds

Traditional taboo systems—found in many premodern or small-scale societies—functioned as powerful normative frameworks that delineated what was absolutely forbidden or unthinkable within a community. By marking certain behaviors and relationships as “taboo,” these societies effectively set boundaries that individuals would rarely dare to cross. Because transgressing a taboo could lead to severe consequences—ritual pollution, ostracism, or supernatural retribution—taboo systems often served as robust mechanisms for maintaining social order and discouraging the kind of indecent or harmful actions we might now call “enabling.”

Yet in many contemporary societies, the cohesive taboo structures of the past have weakened. Below are a few reasons why this has happened, along with references to help you explore further, and thoughts on how taboo systems might (or might not) be repurposed in addressing the modern “absurd” tendency.

1. Erosion of Shared Cosmologies

1. Secularization and Pluralism

   • Traditional taboos were often grounded in a shared religious or cosmological worldview. As societies have secularized or diversified, the common metaphysical foundation that upheld these prohibitions has become fragmented.

   • Émile Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912) shows how collective religious practices once underpinned moral solidarity. In many places, that collective base has splintered, weakening the sanctioning power of taboo.

2. Loss of Unquestioned Authority

   • Taboos typically required a near-universal acceptance that certain matters or behaviors were simply “off-limits.” Modernity, with its emphasis on critical thinking and individual choice, undercuts the unquestioned authority that once sustained taboo.

   • Mary Douglas, in Purity and Danger (1966), discusses how societies construct and enforce notions of purity and pollution—and how these collapse when consensus about the sacred or pure dissolves.

2. Transition to Legal-Rational Frameworks

1. Codification into Law

   • Many behaviors once stigmatized as taboo (e.g., incest, certain forms of violence) have been absorbed into formal legal systems. Instead of communal shame and ritual punishment, we rely on courts and law enforcement.

   • Max Weber’s discussion of “rational-legal authority” (in Economy and Society, 1922) outlines how modern states replaced customary or religious rules with bureaucratic forms of governance.

2. Individual Rights and Liberties

   • The rise of liberal democratic principles emphasizes the individual’s freedom to act as long as it does not infringe upon others’ rights. This ethos can clash with taboo structures that rely on collective moral judgments.

   • John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty (1859) illustrates the shift toward individual autonomy, often at the expense of communal enforcement of norms through taboo.

3. Ambivalence and Abuse of Taboos

1. Potential for Oppression

   • Historically, taboos could be used to ostracize or scapegoat certain groups (e.g., so-called “untouchables,” women during menstruation, or those with perceived “ritual pollution”). Taboos often disproportionately targeted marginalized populations.

   • In Totem and Taboo (1913), Sigmund Freud examines how early tribal prohibitions sometimes fostered collective guilt, fear, and social control. In many modern contexts, there is an ethical aversion to re-embracing taboos that might stigmatize individuals indiscriminately.

2. Selective Enforcement

   • When societies did retain taboos, enforcement could be arbitrary or hypocritical—certain elites were exempt, while commoners bore the brunt of punishment. This double standard weakened the taboo’s moral force.

   • Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (1975) shows how power structures manipulate norms for control, highlighting that taboo can become a tool for oppression rather than a reliable safeguard of decency.

4. Could a Revised Taboo Framework Help Today?

Despite these historical complications, you might still wonder if a more structured system of taboo—or something similar—could address today’s “absurd” tendency to expect decency from those who repeatedly fail to demonstrate it. Possible avenues:

1. Community Enforcement of Boundaries

   • In family or communal settings, reintroducing firm “no-go zones” (for instance, zero tolerance for certain abuses or manipulative behaviors) could serve a similar function to old taboos—making it socially unacceptable to overlook chronic indecency.

   • However, for this to work, there needs to be a shared understanding of which behaviors are absolutely off-limits, plus consistent enforcement to prevent selective punishments or hypocrisy.

2. Shame and Ostracism as Social Tools

   • While shame is often seen as damaging, some advocates of “restorative justice” argue that reintegrative forms of shaming (where the act, not the person, is labeled as unacceptable) can uphold communal ethics.

   • This is a far cry from full-scale taboo, but it touches on the idea that strong social sanctions—short of outright legal punishment—can deter harmful conduct.

3. Ethical “Taboos” Without Dogma

   • Nietzsche called for a “revaluation (or transvaluation) of all values.” One radical interpretation might be forging updated cultural “taboos” based on rational-ethical considerations rather than inherited dogma—i.e., communal moral lines that are collectively decided and enforced through social norms.

   • Such new taboos would focus on behaviors proven to be destructive in repeated, demonstrable ways (e.g., habitual gaslighting, corruption, exploitation), rendering them beyond the pale of what a decent society tolerates.

Balancing Utility and Caution

• Utility: A re-emphasis on taboo-like boundaries might help communities stop enabling chronic indecency, whether in family systems or broader social structures. They could provide moral “guard rails” that discourage people from continuing to expect good faith in obviously toxic situations.

• Caution: Taboos can easily become rigid, fear-based, or co-opted by authoritarian actors. Reintroducing them without critical safeguards risks replacing one form of naivety (unrealistic hope in indecent actors) with another (unquestioning obedience to taboo rules).

Final Thoughts

The traditional taboo system often rested on communal beliefs in sacred prohibitions, maintained by ritual, fear, and shame. In many modern societies, these shared cosmological and social structures have fragmented due to secularization, individualism, and legal-rational governance. Though taboo systems could, in theory, deter “enabling” indecency by drawing unbreakable boundaries, they also carried serious drawbacks—oppression, selective enforcement, and moral rigidity.

A more promising radical approach might be to adapt certain elements of the taboo concept—clear communal boundaries and decisive consequences—into modern frameworks that uphold personal freedoms while firmly rejecting behaviors that repeatedly violate trust, exploit power, or harm the collective. If such a system is to remain ethical, however, it must be transparent, equitable, and open to critical scrutiny—rather than reliant on unquestioned traditions or fear.

Key References and Further Reading

• Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (1966)

• Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912)

• Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo (1913)

• Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (1975)

• Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality (1887) for “transvaluation of values”

• Max Weber, Economy and Society (1922) for “rational-legal authority”

• John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859) for the rise of individual autonomy and critique of oppressive norms

These works offer insights into how traditional taboo systems operated, why they declined, and whether their underlying logic of strict social boundaries can—or should—be reimagined to curb the destructive patterns of expecting decency where it is not forthcoming.

o1

You said:

What happened to the "reasonable" taboos against usury and gambling?

ChatGPT said:

Reasoned for 4 seconds

Historically, many societies held strong taboos against usury (charging interest on loans) and gambling, viewing both as morally hazardous practices that could exploit human vulnerability and destabilize communities. Over centuries, these taboos eroded or were reinterpreted in response to social, economic, and religious transformations. Below is an overview of what happened to these once “reasonable” taboos, along with references that can help verify or expand on key points.

1. Usury

a. Early Moral and Religious Prohibitions

1. Biblical and Canon Law

   • In the Hebrew Bible/Old Testament, charging interest to fellow Israelites was forbidden (e.g., Exodus 22:25, Leviticus 25:35–37).

   • Early Christian doctrine continued to treat usury (understood as any charging of interest) as a grave sin. The First Council of Nicaea (AD 325) and later ecumenical councils periodically reaffirmed that clergy should not lend money at interest.

   • Medieval canon law codified these restrictions; theologians like Thomas Aquinas argued that money itself was sterile and should not “breed” money through interest (Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 78).

2. Islamic Finance

   • Islamic law (Sharia) similarly prohibits riba (usury/interest), viewing interest-based lending as exploitative. This taboo remains influential, though modern Islamic finance has developed forms of profit-sharing or “murabaha” contracts to facilitate economic activity without straightforward interest.

b. Shift During the Late Middle Ages and Renaissance

1. Commercial Expansion

   • As trade expanded in medieval and Renaissance Europe, merchants needed credit to finance voyages and manage risk. Lending with interest became more common among merchants, bankers (e.g., the Medici, Fugger families), and even monarchs.

   • In practice, many Christian communities allowed limited exceptions to the anti-usury rules—sometimes by distinguishing a “reasonable interest” from exploitative rates.

2. Theological and Legal Reinterpretations

   • The Church gradually softened its stance, distinguishing between usura (excessive or exploitative interest) and interesse (a moderate charge to compensate for risk or lost opportunity).

   • In 1830, the Holy Office (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith) essentially recognized that moderate interest could be morally permissible, reflecting an increasingly commercial and industrial society.

c. Rise of Capitalism and Modern Banking

1. Protestant Reformation

   • Reformers like John Calvin permitted interest under certain conditions, provided it served “well-ordered” trade and was not usurious in the sense of crushing the poor. This moral nuance helped legitimize lending in the emerging capitalist economy.

   • R. H. Tawney’s Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (1926) discusses how Protestant attitudes toward profit and interest evolved.

2. National Regulation over Moral Taboo

   • By the 18th and 19th centuries, most Western states had legalized and regulated interest rates, moving the moral question into the realm of economic policy.

   • Today, concerns about “usury” persist mainly around predatory lending (e.g., payday loans with extremely high APRs). The discourse is more about consumer protection laws than a broad religious or cultural taboo.

2. Gambling

a. Ancient and Medieval Prohibitions

1. Religious Condemnation

   • Many religious traditions viewed gambling as a form of temptation leading to greed, idleness, or moral corruption.

   • In medieval Christendom, gambling was associated with vice and sin (frequently condemned in homilies and by councils). Early Islamic authorities similarly frowned on games of chance (maysir), citing the Quranic injunctions against gambling (Qur’an 5:90–91).

2. Civil Bans

   • In many premodern communities, civil authorities joined religious bodies in outlawing gambling or heavily restricting it, fearing social disorder, debt, and crime.

b. Gradual Legalization and Commercial Exploitation

1. Rise of State Lotteries and Regulated Gambling

   • As monarchies and later modern states sought revenue, they discovered lotteries and eventually state-regulated gambling as lucrative sources of income.

   • By the 18th and 19th centuries, state lotteries became common in Europe and the U.S. to fund public projects. While moral opposition remained, the lure of government revenue weakened the old taboos.

2. Commercialization in the 20th Century

   • Casinos became legal in specific zones (e.g., Monte Carlo, Las Vegas, later Atlantic City). Other forms of betting (horse racing, sports betting) gained legal status in many jurisdictions under state oversight and taxation.

   • Governments and private enterprises turned gambling into a significant industry, effectively normalizing it for large segments of the population. The moral stigma receded as it became a regulated, mainstream form of entertainment—though critics continue to point out its social costs (addiction, exploitation).

3. Why Did These Taboos Weaken?

1. Economic Imperatives

   • Modern commerce and state fiscal needs made charging interest and regulating—rather than outright banning—gambling appear more practical.

   • In both cases, the potential for economic growth and state revenue overshadowed strict moral prohibitions.

2. Secularization and Moral Pluralism

   • As societies became more religiously pluralistic (or secular), a single overarching taboo lost its binding force.

   • In the West, Enlightenment values emphasized individual choice and personal freedom, so long as one did not harm others. Usury and gambling became issues of consent, regulation, and market logic rather than absolute moral prohibitions.

3. Shift to “Harm Reduction” Paradigms

   • Rather than forbidding an activity altogether, modern societies often prefer regulating it to mitigate abuses (e.g., capping interest rates, providing gambling addiction services).

   • This is more in keeping with a modern policy approach than with older religious or communal taboos based on spiritual or moral absolutes.

4. Are These Taboos Still “Reasonable” Today?

1. Continued Ethical Debates

   • Critics argue that predatory lending and unregulated gambling disproportionately harm the poor or vulnerable. They call for a return to stricter moral condemnation or at least stronger regulation.

   • Supporters of legalized gambling and interest-based lending counter that adults should have freedom of contract, and that moderate interest and regulated gambling are acceptable in an open society.

2. Resurgence in Certain Communities

   • Some religious communities (e.g., Orthodox Jews, strict Muslims, conservative Christians) maintain strong prohibitions against both usury and gambling. Islamic finance in particular attempts to keep interest out of standard financial transactions.

   • Even in secular settings, criticisms of “usurious” interest and exploitative gambling continue to evoke moral indignation, showing that remnants of the old taboo mentality can still resurface in public discourse.

Concluding Thoughts

Usury and gambling were once governed by robust communal and religious taboos aimed at protecting social well-being from perceived morally corrosive activities. Over time, these taboos gave way to a more pragmatic, regulatory framework that accommodates interest-based lending and legalized gambling under certain guidelines. While absolute prohibitions largely faded in modern secular societies, debates about predatory lending, consumer debt crises, and problem gambling persist—suggesting that the moral concerns behind the old taboos remain relevant.

However, as cultural and economic realities shifted—especially with the rise of capitalism and state-regulated markets—many people no longer see an outright ban as feasible or necessary. Instead, most modern systems try to strike a balance between personal freedom and consumer protection. Whether that balance is effective or whether society needs a revived form of taboo remains a lively point of contention.

Further Reading and References

• Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 78 (on usury).

• R. H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (1926).

• Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905) – background on Protestant attitudes toward profit and lending.

• Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger (1966) – for general insights on how taboos shape social cohesion.

• Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (1975) – exploring how modern states shift from moral to regulatory frameworks for social control.

• Basil of Caesarea and other Early Church Fathers – many wrote treatises condemning usury in strong moral terms.

• Francesco Guala, The Economic Approach to Gambling Regulation (2012) – academic look at how modern states regulate gambling.

These texts provide both historical perspectives and modern analyses that help trace how and why these ancient taboos eroded, and what implications that shift has for contemporary debates about moral and economic governance.

o1

You said:

What happened to the strong taboo against associating with criminals and especially criminal organizations, especially for politicians and businessmen? It appears to be weakening even in Japan.

ChatGPT said:

Reasoned about weakening taboos against criminals for 5 seconds

Historically, many societies maintained strong taboos against associating with criminals—particularly organized crime—believing such ties would taint one’s honor and undermine communal stability. For politicians, business leaders, or other public figures to be seen in collusion with criminal networks was widely deemed scandalous or career-ending. Yet over time, a variety of forces—economic, political, and cultural—have eroded these taboos. Below is an overview of how this shift has played out generally and with specific reference to Japan, along with readings that explore the phenomenon.

1. Traditional Taboos and Their Function

1. Honor and Reputation

   • In many cultures, dealings with criminals threatened not only an individual’s legal standing but their moral reputation. Aligning with criminal elements could result in exile, public shaming, or permanent social stigma.

   • For public officials, even a hint of underworld ties risked scandal that would destroy trust and credibility.

2. Legal and Religious Underpinnings

   • Religious codes and secular laws often reinforced the prohibition. For instance, Christian, Confucian, or Islamic traditions tended to equate criminal activity with “moral pollution,” and associated anyone who enabled or benefited from it with the same taint.

   • In modern nation-states, legal statutes against conspiracy or “aiding and abetting” criminals partially served to keep politicians and public figures at arm’s length from organized crime.

3. Community Vigilance

   • In close-knit settings, people regularly policed each other’s behavior. Because the consequences of associating with criminals could be swift and severe (e.g., ostracism, losing business or office), taboos were powerfully self-enforcing.

2. General Factors Eroding the Taboo

1. Globalization and Complex Economies

   • As economies globalized, financial transactions became more opaque. International banking networks, shell companies, and offshore accounts made it easier for criminal funds to merge with legitimate enterprise.

   • Politicians and business leaders may justify dealings with questionable entities as a “necessary evil” for economic or strategic gain, diluting old moral red lines.

2. Shifts in Public Attitudes

   • In some societies, cynicism toward elites has grown: citizens may assume everyone in power is “dirty,” so revelations of criminal ties no longer shock them as they once did.

   • Media sensationalism and “true crime” pop culture can paradoxically glamorize or normalize the underworld—portraying mobsters and corrupt deals as something akin to a standard feature of modern life.

3. Political and Institutional Corruption

   • Where corruption is deeply embedded, the old taboo loses practical force. If state actors or big businesses regularly benefit from illicit networks, there is little incentive to uphold strong moral boundaries.

   • In certain regions, organized crime effectively provides services or patronage where the state fails, leading segments of the public—and sometimes officials—to see collaboration as pragmatic rather than scandalous.

3. Japan’s Case: From Yakuza Taboo to Partial Integration

a. Historical Relationship Between Yakuza and Society

1. Origins and Semi-Legitimacy

   • The roots of Japan’s yakuza date back to Edo-period itinerant gamblers and peddlers. Over centuries, some yakuza groups fashioned a public image as quasi-chivalrous protectors of neighborhoods, occasionally engaging in philanthropy.

   • These self-styled “ninkyō” (chivalrous) narratives granted them a measure of social acceptance—distinct from how many Western societies viewed organized crime.

2. Postwar Alignments

   • After WWII, certain yakuza factions cultivated ties with politicians and corporations—often to suppress leftist activism, break strikes, or control union activities. Historians point to figures like Kodama Yoshio (an influential right-wing fixer) as emblematic of the postwar underworld’s political entanglements.

   • The line between outright criminality and covert political muscle blurred, weakening the taboo against underworld associations for people in power.

b. Anti-Boryokudan Laws and Shifts in Public Opinion

1. Initial Crackdowns

   • In 1992, Japan enacted the Anti-Boryokudan (anti–organized crime group) Law, reflecting official intent to stigmatize and reduce yakuza influence. Over time, local governments introduced further regulations (bōryokudan haijojōrei) making it illegal to knowingly do business with yakuza or their front companies.

   • These laws tried to reassert a social taboo around direct yakuza affiliation; businesses and politicians were to face serious legal and reputational consequences if caught.

2. Continuing Adaptations

   • Yakuza groups adapted by going underground—rebranding organizations and using front companies. Meanwhile, some politicians and corporate figures used backchannels to exploit the yakuza’s “problem-solving” capacities, especially in real estate, construction, and entertainment.

   • Publicly, condemnations of yakuza remain strong. Yet behind the scenes, investigators note that some mainstream institutions still find ways to collaborate discreetly.

c. Signs of a Weakening Taboo—Even in Japan

1. Media Exposés

   • Investigations into shady real estate deals or political funding often reveal underworld connections. While these can spark temporary scandals, few careers end permanently as a result—suggesting a growing public fatalism or acceptance.

   • Robert Whiting’s Tokyo Underworld (1999) and David E. Kaplan & Alec Dubro’s Yakuza: Japan’s Criminal Underworld (2003) chronicle how entrenched yakuza-business ties remain despite formal legal proscriptions.

2. Changing Economic Landscape

   • As Japan’s economy stagnated in the 1990s (the so-called “Lost Decade”), some businesses turned a blind eye to gangster-linked capital if it helped keep them afloat.

   • The pragmatic logic—“capital is capital”—can override older moral and social ostracism, especially if official enforcement is patchy.

3. Ongoing Crackdown vs. Reality

   • Despite strong legislative and cultural efforts to isolate organized crime, the taboo can be selectively enforced. Elite figures may treat it as an inconvenience rather than a hard moral or legal line.

   • Journalist Jake Adelstein has written extensively (e.g., Tokyo Vice, 2009) about the contradictions in Japan’s crackdown: on paper, the laws are strict, yet in practice, yakuza influence persists through subtler channels.

4. Implications of Weakened Taboos

1. Normalization of Corruption

   • As the taboo fades, corrupt or ethically questionable alliances can flourish, eroding public trust in political and economic institutions. Voters, feeling disillusioned, may become more apathetic or cynical.

   • This dynamic is not unique to Japan: similar patterns appear in countries where politicians openly fraternize with organized crime without facing decisive backlash (e.g., Italy’s mafia connections, parts of Latin America’s narco-politics).

2. Potential for Backlash

   • In some cases, revelations of criminal collusion still spark moral outrage. A major scandal can reignite calls for renewed enforcement or stricter laws.

   • Over the long run, if associations with underworld figures become too blatant, the public or international bodies (e.g., anti-money-laundering regulators) may force a recalibration.

3. Eroding Norms in a Global Context

   • As global economic and information networks expand, so do illicit financial flows. The fading of strict social taboos means that once-scandalous ties can be glossed over as “just business.”

   • Combined with the general cynicism about elites, a robust moral stance against criminal collusion is harder to maintain—unless reinforced by vigilant media, civil society, and legal institutions.

Concluding Thoughts

The traditional taboo against associating with criminals has weakened for multiple reasons: economic pragmatism, globalized financial systems, selective enforcement, and public cynicism. Japan, once noted for a strong (if sometimes contradictory) stance against yakuza influences, illustrates how even a society with formal anti–organized crime laws and cultural disdain for overt wrongdoing can struggle to maintain that taboo in practice. Politicians and business leaders often find ways to rationalize or hide their dealings, and the public—though still scandalized by brazen cases—may become more resigned than outraged.

Whether future reforms or a renewed moral consensus can restore a robust stigma around criminal collusion remains uncertain. Ultimately, a taboo is only as strong as the communal will to enforce it. In an era of complex global capitalism and widespread political distrust, that will can be difficult to sustain—unless both government accountability mechanisms and public vigilance are reinvigorated to draw clear, unwavering lines that even powerful figures cannot cross with impunity.

Suggested Sources and Further Reading

• Jake Adelstein, Tokyo Vice: An American Reporter on the Police Beat in Japan (2009) – investigative journalism on yakuza-politics ties.

• David E. Kaplan & Alec Dubro, Yakuza: Japan’s Criminal Underworld (1986; rev. ed. 2003) – detailed history and analysis of the yakuza’s societal role.

• Robert Whiting, Tokyo Underworld (1999) – looks at the interplay of crime, politics, and business in postwar Tokyo.

• Max Weber, Economy and Society (1922) – although not specific to organized crime, provides a framework on how modern state rationalization can supplant older moral taboos.

• Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (1975) – offers insights on how power and discipline shift from community enforcement of norms (taboos) to legal-bureaucratic modes of control, which can be co-opted or circumvented by elites.

Each of these sources helps illustrate why strong taboos against criminal association, once taken for granted, may have eroded—and what might be required if society wishes to reestablish them in a meaningful, enforceable way.

o1

You said:

Now we are even losing the taboo against consorting with traditional national enemies. What's going on?

ChatGPT said:

Reasoned for 6 seconds

Historically, consorting with a “traditional national enemy” was viewed as morally taboo, tantamount to treason, or at least shameful. Nations often cultivated stark “us vs. them” narratives—not merely for propaganda but as a protective social boundary. Over time, however, several forces have eroded this taboo, creating a climate in which politicians, business leaders, and even citizens feel less compunction about engaging with long-standing adversaries. Below is an overview of key factors behind this shift, illustrated with historical and contemporary references.

1. Changing Geopolitical Landscapes

a. Collapse of Bipolar Blocs and Realignment

• Post–Cold War Reordering: The end of the Cold War in 1991 dissolved the rigid bipolar structure that pitted the capitalist West against the communist Eastern Bloc. This opened pathways for diplomatic and economic ties that were previously inconceivable.

• Constantly Shifting Alliances: Realpolitik—often associated with thinkers like Hans Morgenthau (Politics Among Nations, 1948) and, more recently, John Mearsheimer (The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 2001)—emphasizes that states pursue interests rather than moral absolutes. Former “enemies” become partners if it serves short-term or long-term strategic ends.

b. Multipolarity and Pragmatism

• Rise of Emerging Powers: As new power centers (e.g., China, India, the EU) gain global influence, older animosities can be overshadowed by fresh interests and alliances.

• Issue-Specific Coalitions: Countries that were once fierce adversaries may cooperate on certain global challenges (trade, climate, counterterrorism) even if they remain rivals in other domains. This pragmatic cooperation erodes the old taboo of “never consort with the enemy.”

2. Global Economic Interdependence

a. Trade and Investment Networks

• Deepening Economic Ties: In an era of globalized commerce, supply chains cross former lines of enmity. Tariffs and sanctions notwithstanding, many economies become too interconnected to maintain a strict boycott of old adversaries.

• Corporate Interests over Patriotism: Multinational corporations increasingly prioritize profit. They lobby for market access and joint ventures worldwide, including in historically hostile nations. The taboo against “trading with the enemy” weakens when major economic gains are at stake.

b. Capital Flows and Technology Transfer

• Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): Governments often seek foreign capital even from rival states. For instance, technology or manufacturing might rely on components produced in a “traditional enemy” country.

• Offshoring and Outsourcing: As businesses outsource labor to countries with lower costs (sometimes old adversaries), moral or patriotic objections become secondary to market logic.

References:

• Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy (2001) – on how increasing interdependence changes international norms.

• Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World (1990) – an early argument that global economics dilutes nationalistic boundaries.

3. Evolving National Identities and Cosmopolitan Values

a. Decline of Fierce Nationalism (in Some Contexts)

• Generational Shifts: Younger generations in many countries see themselves as global citizens, less burdened by their grandparents’ memories of war or colonization.

• Cultural Exchanges: Media, travel, and social networks expose people to human stories from “enemy” nations, softening old stereotypes.

b. Rise of Cosmopolitan Norms

• Human Rights and International Institutions: Following World War II, bodies like the United Nations encouraged dialogue and conflict resolution. The taboo on speaking with an “enemy” softened under norms of diplomatic engagement.

• Global Civil Society: Transnational NGOs, academic collaborations, and cultural projects can spur cross-border empathy—even between historically hostile nations.

References:

• Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (1983) – explains how national identity is constructed and can be deconstructed or reimagined.

• Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers (2006) – on how global interconnectedness alters our sense of who is “other.”

4. Public Cynicism and Realpolitik Calculations

a. “Everyone Does It” Mindset

• Normalization of Deals with Adversaries: When revelations surface that well-known public figures consort with rival states, initial shock may subside into resignation. The public might feel that “this is just how the world works.”

• Media and Scandal Fatigue: Constant media exposure to political controversies can dull moral outrage. The repeated “breaking news” cycle around leaders’ questionable alliances no longer triggers the old level of taboo-driven condemnation.

b. Hybrid Warfare and Proxy Conflicts

• The Enemy of My Enemy Is My Friend: In regions with overlapping proxy conflicts (e.g., Middle East, parts of Africa), alliances form and dissolve rapidly. Consorting with a one-time enemy might be rationalized as a strategic necessity to contain a bigger threat.

• Information Warfare: Modern disinformation campaigns further muddy distinctions between allies and enemies, making it less clear which external contacts are taboo or not.

5. Examples of Taboo Erosion

1. U.S. Engagements with Former Adversaries

   • The U.S. historically refused diplomatic recognition to certain regimes (e.g., Communist China pre-1979, Cuba until recently). Yet economic and strategic interests eventually pushed for détente or normalized relations, blurring the lines around “enemy” status.

2. European Integration

   • The European Union was founded partly to prevent another devastating war by interlinking national economies (especially France and Germany). Former “archenemies” are now close partners. The taboo against consorting with each other all but vanished, replaced by integrated governance structures.

3. Japan and China

   • Despite a bitter legacy of conflict and territorial disputes, Japan and China maintain massive trade relationships. Major Japanese corporations rely on Chinese production facilities, demonstrating how economic pragmatism undercuts old nationalist taboos.

6. Consequences of This Trend

a. Benefits: De-escalation and Mutual Gains

• Economic Growth and Stability: Cross-border commerce can reduce the likelihood of hot conflict. Nations that trade heavily are less inclined to wage outright war.

• Diplomatic Bridges: Even if tensions persist, open channels with an adversary can help manage crises and foster incremental reconciliation over time.

b. Risks: Opportunism and Ethical Compromises

• Undermined Accountability: If taboos dissolve, politicians or corporations might collaborate with regimes known for human rights abuses or expansionism—eroding moral norms.

• Strategic Vulnerabilities: Deep entanglements with a hostile power can become a national security liability (e.g., reliance on adversaries for critical resources or technology).

Final Reflections

In sum, the taboo against consorting with traditional enemies has weakened as globalization, shifting alliances, and evolving cultural norms have encouraged pragmatic or opportunistic engagement over moral condemnation. What was once seen as treasonous can now be reframed as diplomacy, commerce, or realpolitik. While such flexibility can yield peace dividends and economic benefits, it can also raise uncomfortable ethical questions about enabling or legitimizing harmful regimes. The erosion of this taboo thus exemplifies both the promise and the perils of a deeply interconnected world.

Suggested Readings

1. Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (1948) – early realist take on why states choose pragmatic alliances.

2. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001) – the persistence of realpolitik in modern geopolitics.

3. Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy (2001) – on how economic interdependence reshapes state behavior and identities.

4. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (1983) – how national boundaries and loyalties are constructed.

5. Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitanism (2006) – on moral and cultural impacts of global interconnection.

6. Barry Buzan & Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers (2003) – how regional security complexes lead to evolving alliances, including with former enemies.

All these works provide deeper insight into the broader historical and ideological reasons that have allowed and, in many cases, encouraged people to engage—even quite willingly—with those long regarded as hostile “others.”

o1

You said:

Do we still have the strong taboo and shame against government handouts for individuals, but never for corporations?

ChatGPT said:

Reasoned about government handouts and taboos for a few seconds

In many contemporary societies—especially in the United States—there persists a strong cultural stigma around “government handouts” when given to individuals (e.g., welfare, food stamps, or unemployment benefits). Meanwhile, large-scale subsidies or bailouts for corporations tend to evoke far less public shame or moral condemnation, even though they, too, are funded by the public purse. This double standard has evolved over decades, shaped by political narratives, economic ideologies, and media portrayals. Below is an exploration of how and why these divergent attitudes exist, supported by references for deeper study.

1. Historical Roots of Welfare Stigma for Individuals

1. Poor Laws and “Deserving vs. Undeserving”

   • In Western contexts, going back to the English Poor Laws (16th–17th centuries), society distinguished between the “deserving” (e.g., widows, orphans, the disabled) and “undeserving” (able-bodied but poor) recipients of aid.

   • This distinction laid the foundation for viewing direct assistance to individuals as morally suspect unless they fit a narrow, sympathetic profile.

   • Reference: Michael B. Katz, The Undeserving Poor: America’s Enduring Confrontation with Poverty (1989).

2. American Individualism and the Protestant Work Ethic

   • In the U.S., a cultural emphasis on self-reliance and the “Protestant work ethic” (as described by Max Weber in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 1905) contributed to seeing personal financial struggle as a moral failing.

   • By the 20th century, programs such as the New Deal encountered backlash from critics who believed government support would encourage laziness. By the 1980s, political rhetoric (e.g., Ronald Reagan’s invocation of the “welfare queen”) further entrenched negative stereotypes of public-aid recipients.

3. Media Portrayals and Racialized Stereotypes

   • Sociologist Martin Gilens (Why Americans Hate Welfare, 1999) documents how U.S. media often over-represent Black Americans in stories about welfare, reinforcing racially charged views that recipients are “lazy” or “gaming the system.”

   • This portrayal intensifies the stigma, making welfare for individuals a more contentious issue politically and culturally.

2. Why Corporate Subsidies Often Escape Shame

1. Ideological Framing of “Job Creation”

   • When corporations receive subsidies, tax breaks, or bailouts, politicians and business leaders often frame it as essential for protecting jobs, supporting “innovation,” or maintaining economic stability.

   • This rhetoric casts corporate assistance as an investment in the public good rather than a “handout,” even if the firm in question was irresponsible or the subsidy has questionable public benefit.

   • Reference: Kenneth Thomas, Investment Incentives and the Global Competition for Capital (2007) – discusses how governments justify subsidies to corporations by citing economic development.

2. Lack of Individual Moral Judgment

   • Because a corporation is an entity rather than a person, public discourse seldom focuses on “personal responsibility” or moral failing in the same way it does for individual aid recipients.

   • The “shame” factor is dispersed, and corporate executives rarely face personal stigma for accepting government funds—even if the aid directly boosts shareholder returns or executive compensation.

3. Lobbying Power and Policy Influence

   • Large corporations often maintain sophisticated lobbying operations and close ties to policymakers. They can shape legislation and public messaging to normalize or justify subsidies.

   • Over time, these relationships can blunt public criticism and embed subsidies as a routine part of economic policy.

   • Reference: Lee Drutman, The Business of America is Lobbying (2015) – on how corporate lobbying influences policy decisions, including subsidies.

4. Information Asymmetry and Media Coverage

   • Individual welfare programs are highly visible and frequently politicized (think of “food stamp fraud” stories). In contrast, details about corporate tax breaks or subsidies are often buried in complex budgets or legislative bills, receiving less sensational media scrutiny.

   • This limited visibility can lessen public outrage, as the connection between “corporate handouts” and taxpayer dollars is more opaque.

3. Contemporary Examples and Contrasts

1. Bailouts During Economic Crises

   • The 2008 financial crisis in the U.S. prompted massive bank bailouts (TARP—Troubled Asset Relief Program). While there was some public anger (“Occupy Wall Street”), the stigma did not universally attach to the bankers themselves in the same way welfare recipients are shamed.

   • During the COVID-19 pandemic, large stimulus packages again included significant funds for big corporations (e.g., airlines), often framed as stabilizing vital industries.

2. State and Local Subsidies

   • Governments frequently offer tax incentives to corporations to locate facilities in their jurisdiction. While these are direct foregone revenues, they are publicized as “economic development” or “job creation,” not “corporate welfare.”

   • In contrast, an unemployed individual seeking extended benefits can be portrayed as a “freeloader” or a drain on resources.

3. Recent Shifts in Rhetoric

   • Some lawmakers and activists have begun using the term “corporate welfare” to highlight this double standard. For instance, critiques arose around Amazon’s HQ2 bids, in which states competed by offering lavish incentives.

   • Nonetheless, the stigma faced by individuals on welfare remains disproportionately harsher in mainstream discourse.

4. Psychological and Cultural Underpinnings

1. Moral vs. Functional Conceptions of Aid

   • Aid to individuals (welfare) is often framed in moral terms, invoking the idea of personal virtue or vice. Corporate aid, by contrast, is typically rationalized through economic or functional arguments, bypassing the moral lens.

   • Reference: Leslie McCall, The Undeserving Rich: American Beliefs about Inequality, Opportunity, and Redistribution (2013) – discusses how Americans reconcile large wealth transfers at the top with moral concerns about “handouts” at the bottom.

2. Individual Responsibility vs. Structural Factors

   • Discussions about individual welfare recipients frequently ignore structural issues (lack of jobs, systemic inequality) and focus on presumed personal failings.

   • Corporations receiving subsidies are viewed as part of a broader system—“That’s just how business works.” This systemic perspective can dampen moral outrage.

3. The Logic of Scale

   • Large numbers (billions in corporate subsidies) can be abstract, whereas an individual receiving a few hundred dollars can be made a concrete, relatable example—often in a negative sense. This difference in scale perception shapes how people react to the two forms of government support.

5. Potential Shifts or Reforms

1. Greater Transparency and Media Scrutiny

   • Some advocates call for publicly accessible “subsidy trackers” and more investigative journalism on corporate welfare. If these become more visible, public opinion may start applying moral scrutiny similar to that placed on welfare programs.

   • Example: Good Jobs First, an organization that maintains a Subsidy Tracker database in the U.S.

2. Rebranding Social Assistance

   • Efforts to destigmatize individual welfare—by framing it as social insurance or an investment in human capital—mirror the language used for corporate subsidies (e.g., “job creation,” “economic development”).

   • If successful, these efforts might erode the moral double standard.

3. Policy Solutions and Public Awareness

   • Proposals such as universal basic income or negative income tax attempt to normalize direct payments to individuals by removing conditionality and moral judgment.

   • Likewise, capping or banning certain corporate incentives has been debated, though entrenched interests often resist.

Conclusion

Yes, there remains a strong stigma and sense of shame around government assistance for individuals—rooted in a long history of viewing poverty as a moral failing and shaped by cultural, religious, and political narratives. On the other hand, corporate subsidies rarely provoke the same ethical condemnation, thanks to economic framing, lobbying power, and more opaque media coverage. This divergence is not a universal law—some people and movements do criticize “corporate welfare”—but the broader cultural norm still permits large-scale support for businesses while stigmatizing aid to individual citizens. Whether this imbalance persists may depend on public awareness, policy reform, and shifts in how society conceives of responsibility and support in a globalized economy.

Further Reading

• Michael B. Katz, The Undeserving Poor (1989)

• Martin Gilens, Why Americans Hate Welfare (1999)

• Leslie McCall, The Undeserving Rich: American Beliefs about Inequality, Opportunity, and Redistribution (2013)

• Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905)

• Lee Drutman, The Business of America is Lobbying (2015)

• Good Jobs First (Subsidy Tracker) – [though no live links, the group is known for examining corporate subsidies in the U.S.]

Each of these works offers insights into how and why modern societies stigmatize individual welfare while often normalizing or even celebrating financial aid to corporations—and how such perceptions might evolve in the future.

o1

You said:

Is it possible that our misguided and misunderstood individualism is dismantling the powerful social control mechanism of taboos, in all the wrong places?

ChatGPT said:

Reasoned about the erosion of taboos for a few seconds

Short Answer:
Yes, it is possible. A “misguided” or “misunderstood” form of individualism—one that emphasizes personal autonomy at the expense of collective values—can indeed undermine traditional communal norms and taboo systems in ways that may not always benefit society. When taboos that once served to protect community well-being are weakened without thoughtful replacement, social trust and accountability can erode. Meanwhile, more trivial or less socially beneficial norms sometimes remain intact. This dynamic helps explain why many once-powerful social control mechanisms, from family strictures to communal shame around exploitative behavior, seem to be dissolving—potentially “in all the wrong places.”

Below is a more detailed exploration of how and why that might be happening, along with references to major thinkers who have grappled with these shifts.

1. Taboos as Social Control Mechanisms

1. Communal Cohesion and Moral Boundaries

   • Taboos traditionally mark moral boundaries that a community upholds as inviolable. They rely on shared beliefs about purity, danger, and the common good, and are enforced through collective shame or ostracism.

   • Reference: Mary Douglas’s Purity and Danger (1966) analyzes how taboos regulate social order by creating categories of “clean” versus “polluted.”

2. Ritual and Sacredness

   • Many taboos are buttressed by religious or quasi-religious rituals that legitimize them as sacred. Violating these norms once triggered deep social and spiritual consequences.

   • Reference: Émile Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912) shows how shared sacred rituals and beliefs reinforce the moral community.

2. The Rise (and Misinterpretation) of Individualism

1. Philosophical and Religious Roots

   • Early modern thinkers (e.g., John Locke) and religious movements like certain strains of Protestantism emphasized individual conscience and personal salvation. Over time, this shifted moral responsibility inward, away from communal enforcement.

   • Reference: Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905) explores how individual moral autonomy was linked to emerging capitalist values.

2. Misunderstood Individualism vs. Enlightened Autonomy

   • Enlightenment philosophers championed individual rights as a means of liberation from oppressive hierarchies. However, “misunderstood individualism” can turn into a kind of radical self-sovereignty that dismisses communal obligations altogether.

   • Reference: Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (1835/1840) recognizes the risk of “excessive individualism,” whereby people focus on private interests and neglect civic duties.

3. Consumer Culture and Atomization

   • In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, individualism is increasingly shaped by market forces and consumer identity rather than moral or spiritual frameworks. People learn to see themselves primarily as consumers with personal preferences, not as members of a moral community.

   • Reference: Zygmunt Bauman’s Liquid Modernity (2000) underscores how modern life fragments communal ties, leaving individuals adrift and less influenced by collective taboos.

3. How Individualism Undermines Taboos “in All the Wrong Places”

1. Disintegration of Communal Safeguards

   • As individuals disengage from communal norms, the shame or ostracism that once enforced taboos loses potency. This can be beneficial when it liberates people from unjust or oppressive taboos (e.g., those based on prejudice), but it also dismantles norms that protected communal welfare (e.g., taboos against exploitative behavior).

   • Example: The weakening of certain family-related or sexual-exploitation taboos, or the dilution of ethical constraints on political or corporate behavior.

2. Selective Survival of Profit-Driven “Taboos”

   • In consumer capitalist societies, the market may reinforce pseudo-taboos—such as brand loyalty, social media “cancellations,” or corporate norms—that do not necessarily serve the wider public good.

   • Reference: Michel Foucault’s discussions of power in Discipline and Punish (1975) and The History of Sexuality (1976–1984) show how old moral constraints morph into new forms of discipline, often serving institutional or commercial interests rather than collective moral aims.

3. Loss of Meaningful Moral Debate

   • Alasdair MacIntyre in After Virtue (1981) argues that modern societies lack a coherent moral language for discussing virtue and the common good. This vacuum can lead to moral fragmentation: once-protective taboos break down, but new, robust ethical systems fail to take their place.

4. Consequences of Eroding Taboos Without Adequate Replacements

1. Reduced Social Accountability

   • Behaviors that once triggered moral outrage—e.g., unchecked greed, corruption, or disregard for communal responsibilities—can slip by when individual autonomy is prized above communal well-being.

   • Example: Politicians consorting with criminals or corporations acting with impunity can face minimal social sanction if collective shame is no longer potent.

2. Moral and Social Isolation

   • Individuals may find themselves increasingly atomized, with fewer communal bonds to rely on in times of need—precisely because those bonds depended on shared norms and taboos.

   • Reference: Tönnies’s Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (1887) distinguishes between close-knit community (Gemeinschaft) and society based on impersonal association (Gesellschaft); the latter tends to erode taboo-based communal controls.

3. Rise of Ad Hoc Moral Panics

   • Ironically, the breakdown of traditional taboos can lead to sporadic moral panics over less consequential issues, as people search for new objects of collective outrage. Social media “pile-ons” sometimes fill this vacuum, but do so inconsistently and often without deeper ethical grounding.

5. Potential Pathways and Correctives

1. Conscious Reimagining of Communal Values

   • Some thinkers call for a “transvaluation of values” (Nietzsche) or a renewal of shared ethical frameworks (MacIntyre). These efforts aim to restore a sense of collective responsibility without resorting to oppressive dogma.

   • This could mean reasserting communal taboos around exploitative practices (e.g., corruption, environmental destruction) while allowing for personal liberties that do not harm the common good.

2. Local and Intentional Communities

   • Intentional communities, cooperative movements, and other grassroots experiments sometimes reintroduce moral norms or “taboos” for group cohesion—emphasizing shared governance and accountability.

   • The challenge is to balance individual rights with communal standards so that neither collapses under the weight of the other.

3. Civic Education and Democratic Deliberation

   • Reviving a robust culture of moral and civic education may help individuals understand that personal freedom and communal well-being are interdependent, not mutually exclusive.

   • Efforts at participatory democracy—citizen assemblies, town halls—can reinforce norms of accountability and reintroduce social sanctions for destructive behaviors.

Final Reflections

A misunderstood brand of individualism often chips away at communal taboos, effectively dissolving social control mechanisms. While certain taboos (rooted in prejudice or oppression) should rightly be dismantled, the haphazard erosion of all taboo systems can leave society vulnerable to unchecked self-interest and a lack of moral guardrails. Balancing individual freedom with collective norms requires a nuanced conversation about which taboos are oppressive relics and which serve a genuine communal good.

In short, yes, it is quite possible that in our quest to liberate individuals from rigid moral boundaries, we have inadvertently dismantled norms that protected society from its worst impulses—undoing those taboos “in all the wrong places.” The solution lies in forging renewed moral frameworks that preserve healthy communal limits while respecting legitimate personal autonomy.

Recommended Readings

• Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger (1966) – on how taboos structure social cohesion.

• Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912) – for understanding the sacred underpinnings of communal norms.

• Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1835/1840) – highlights the tension between individualism and civic responsibility.

• Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (1981) – on the modern world’s loss of shared moral frameworks.

• Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity (2000) – examines how rapid change undermines stable communal structures.

• Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (1975) – on how older social controls mutate in modern institutions.

• Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality (1887) – on the call for a “transvaluation of all values.”

• Ferdinand Tönnies, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (1887) – distinguishes close-knit communal bonds from more transactional social relations.

These works collectively illuminate how individualism, modernity, and shifting power structures have both freed us from oppressive norms and unsettled the communal taboos that once served as guardrails for social behavior.

o1

You said:

But we are now strengthening the taboos against abortion and homosexuality. Absurd, isn't it?

ChatGPT said:

Reasoned for a few seconds

Yes, it can appear paradoxical or “absurd” that certain traditional taboos are being revived or even strengthened—particularly around abortion and homosexuality—while other longstanding communal norms are dissolving. This seeming contradiction reflects deeper cultural and political fault lines, where different factions reinterpret or selectively preserve taboos that align with their moral or ideological priorities. Below is an overview of why this happens, framed in historical and sociological context, with pointers to further reading.

1. The Fragmentation of Shared Moral Frameworks

1. Decline of a Single Overarching “Value System”

   • Modernity, secularization, and pluralism have weakened once-dominant religious or communal norms that uniformly governed personal behavior (for example, Catholic Europe in the Middle Ages or many traditional societies).

   • However, in the absence of a single unifying value system, different groups can rally around selective issues—often those that resonate with their worldview, identity, or political goals.

   • Reference: Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue (1981) argues that once societies lose a coherent moral consensus, they splinter into competing “moral languages” and can enforce taboos inconsistently.

2. Rise of Identity-Based and Ideological “Tribes”

   • Media fragmentation and political polarization have led to “communities of belief” that reinforce each other’s moral standpoints.

   • Some of these communities feel threatened by rapid social change (e.g., the legalization of same-sex marriage, shifts in gender norms, evolving attitudes toward sexuality), prompting them to double down on what they see as fundamental moral taboos (abortion, homosexuality).

   • Reference: Cass Sunstein’s #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media (2017) details how echo chambers and group polarization can entrench moral positions.

2. Mechanisms Behind Strengthening “Traditional” Taboos

1. Moral Panic and Political Mobilization

   • Sociologist Stanley Cohen’s notion of “moral panic” (Folk Devils and Moral Panics, 1972) explains how certain issues (e.g., abortion, LGBTQ+ rights) become symbolic battlegrounds for society’s anxieties.

   • Political actors can galvanize supporters by framing these topics as existential threats to family, tradition, or “moral order,” thereby heightening taboos.

2. Religious and Ideological Revival

   • In some contexts, a reassertion of conservative religious doctrine (e.g., Christian fundamentalism in parts of the U.S., certain Islamic or Hindu revivalist movements, etc.) reinforces prohibitions on abortion and same-sex relationships.

   • These movements may view secularization and individual freedoms as undermining community and religious identity, motivating them to push for stricter enforcement of old taboos.

3. Selective Conservatism

   • Groups that promote a laissez-faire stance in economics or personal autonomy in matters like gun ownership might simultaneously champion strict control over reproductive rights or sexual orientation.

   • This apparent contradiction can be reconciled within a moral or political ideology that sees “family values” and certain social norms as non-negotiable, even as it rejects government intervention in other domains.

3. Why Other Taboos Are Weakening While These Are Strengthening

1. Different Domains of Behavior

   • Taboos that are weakening often pertain to economics, politics, or personal lifestyles (e.g., consorting with criminals, corporate welfare, or commercial sex). These are sometimes reframed in pragmatic or market terms (“It’s just business”).

   • Meanwhile, abortion and homosexuality concern deeply personal or bodily matters tied to religious or cultural views of purity, family, and identity. Because they trigger core beliefs about life, sexuality, and moral order, taboos around them can prove more resistant to liberalizing trends—or can be deliberately revived.

2. Symbolic Resonance

   • Sexuality and reproductive rights have always had powerful symbolic resonance. Movements that seek to “restore order” frequently focus on controlling or regulating bodily autonomy—seeing it as central to maintaining traditional social structures.

   • In contrast, many older taboos (like lending at interest, strict nepotism rules, or bars on consorting with enemies) are losing symbolic force or have been replaced by modern legal or economic frameworks.

3. Political Utility

   • Politicians or activists can use wedge issues like abortion or LGBTQ+ rights to mobilize their base, secure funding, and claim moral legitimacy. By positioning themselves as protectors of moral tradition, they strengthen those particular taboos for strategic ends.

   • Reference: Clyde Wilcox & Carin Robinson, Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics (2010) shows how U.S. conservative coalitions have leveraged abortion and gay rights for political mobilization.

4. Consequences of Strengthening Certain Taboos While Others Fade

1. Polarization and Cultural Conflict

   • When abortion or homosexuality become flashpoints, societies can become deeply polarized. Over time, these issues can overshadow other policy debates (economic inequality, environmental policy, healthcare).

   • Stigmatizing or criminalizing one group (e.g., women seeking abortions, LGBTQ+ individuals) while ignoring corporate or political misdeeds creates moral double standards that deepen social rifts.

2. Uneven Applications of Moral Authority

   • A society that harshly punishes certain behaviors (sexual or reproductive) but tolerates corruption or exploitation (in business or politics) sends contradictory moral messages, undermining trust in public institutions.

   • Legal systems and social sanctions may be mobilized disproportionately against marginalized individuals (e.g., pregnant women in restrictive abortion regimes, LGBTQ+ people in anti-sodomy laws) while powerful actors in business or politics remain relatively unscathed.

3. International and Cultural Backlash

   • Nations or regions that intensify taboos around abortion and homosexuality can face condemnation from liberal democracies or international human rights organizations.

   • Conversely, some states wear this condemnation as a badge of cultural independence or religious fidelity, further entrenching taboos.

5. Strategies for Addressing the Contradiction

1. Broader, Consistent Moral Framework

   • Advocates for equality and human rights often argue that societies need a consistent approach to moral taboos—focusing on harm reduction, justice, and fairness, rather than selective moral crusades.

   • Renewed calls for accountability in business and politics (e.g., reasserting taboos against corruption) could balance the moral scales.

2. Critical Engagement and Dialogue

   • Civil discourse and education can expose how certain taboos are stoked for political gain. Empathy-building and fact-based conversations may gradually reduce the stigma around abortion and LGBTQ+ identities.

   • Reference: Martha C. Nussbaum, From Disgust to Humanity: Sexual Orientation and Constitutional Law (2010) explores how moral “disgust” can shift to respect for human dignity through ethical reasoning and legal frameworks.

3. Legal Protections and Activism

   • Where taboos lead to harmful policies (e.g., criminalizing or severely limiting abortion, persecuting sexual minorities), legal advocacy and grassroots activism become essential to safeguard individual rights.

   • Over time, consistent judicial rulings or legislative changes can chip away at these taboos, as happened in many countries that once severely punished homosexuality.

Final Reflections

It is indeed paradoxical that certain centuries-old taboos (like suspicion of corrupt dealings, usury, or social exploitation) are eroding, while others centered on personal bodily autonomy—abortion and homosexuality—are being selectively revived or reinforced. This mismatch often reflects political, religious, and social movements that find these “moral” issues more potent for mobilizing support and asserting identity. Calling it “absurd” underscores the frustration many feel when witnessing moral outrage applied inconsistently: strictly controlling some personal freedoms, yet turning a blind eye to significant forms of injustice or exploitation. Whether these tightened taboos persist or ultimately give way often depends on broader struggles over cultural identity, political power, and the evolving moral imagination of the public.

Further Reading

• Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics (1972) – on how societies pick certain issues (like abortion or homosexuality) as flashpoints for moral conflict.

• Martha C. Nussbaum, From Disgust to Humanity: Sexual Orientation and Constitutional Law (2010) – explores how deeply rooted moral disgust informs taboos around homosexuality.

• Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (1981) – discusses the fragmentation of moral discourse in modern society.

• Clyde Wilcox & Carin Robinson, Onward Christian Soldiers? The Religious Right in American Politics (2010) – details how abortion and gay rights became core rallying issues for conservative movements.

• Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vols. 1–3 (1976–1984) – shows how societies construct sexual “deviance” and regulate bodies, influencing taboos.

These sources provide sociological, philosophical, and historical perspectives that help explain why taboos around abortion and homosexuality might intensify even as other traditional norms recede—and why such intensification can indeed appear “absurd” in the broader context of shifting societal values.

o1

You said:

Could there be a hidden "logic" behind this absurdity?

ChatGPT said:

Reasoned for 4 seconds

Short Answer:
Yes, there can be a hidden “logic” behind what appears to be an absurd or contradictory pattern—where certain taboos (e.g., around corruption, collaboration with criminals, or corporate welfare) are weakening, while others (around abortion and homosexuality) are being reinforced. From a sociological and philosophical standpoint, taboos do not simply vanish or arise arbitrarily: they often shift in response to deeper power structures, group identities, and social anxieties. Below is a more detailed analysis of how this dynamic might operate, along with references for further reading.

1. Taboos as Social and Political Tools

1. Durkheim and the Collective Consciousness

   • Émile Durkheim argued in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912) that taboos reflect what a society deems sacred or deeply significant. Strengthening or relaxing a taboo is a collective decision—often unconscious—that expresses where social stress points lie.

   • As societal concerns shift (e.g., from external foes to internal “moral threats”), the focus of taboos may pivot in surprising ways.

2. Power and Moral Regulation

   • Michel Foucault’s work (Discipline and Punish, 1975; The History of Sexuality, 1976–84) shows how institutions wield moral or legal rules (including taboos) to discipline bodies and minds. When certain taboos loosen, it may be because power holders no longer see them as essential to social control.

   • Conversely, taboos around abortion or homosexuality could be tightened if they serve current power interests or moral entrepreneurs seeking to galvanize a constituency.

3. Social Function vs. Moral Absolutes

   • From a functionalist viewpoint (influenced by thinkers like Talcott Parsons), taboos can be seen as mechanisms for maintaining social order and group identity. If a taboo no longer serves those ends—e.g., the old stigma on usury might impede a booming finance sector—it weakens.

   • Meanwhile, sexuality-related taboos might still serve a function for certain groups in defining who is “in” or “out,” enforcing cohesion by rallying around a common moral stance.

2. The “Hidden Logic” Driving Contradictions

1. Identity and Boundary-Making

   • Communities often reinforce taboos that help define their moral or cultural identity. In times of rapid social change, doubling down on abortion and homosexuality taboos can crystallize an “us vs. them” divide.

   • This boundary-making process can overshadow older taboos (like consorting with criminals or corporate welfare) if those do not strongly reinforce group identity in the same way.

2. Rene Girard and Scapegoating

   • René Girard’s theory (Violence and the Sacred, 1972) posits that societies often channel collective tension onto scapegoated groups or behaviors. If certain scapegoats (e.g., “welfare cheats,” “the corrupt politician”) no longer unify public anger effectively, a different scapegoat might take center stage (e.g., LGBTQ+ individuals, women seeking abortions).

   • This shift can look irrational—why ignore glaring corruptions of power while fixating on personal bodily autonomy?—but in Girardian terms, what matters is maintaining social cohesion by targeting an out-group.

3. Moral Entrepreneurs and Political Strategy

   • Sociologist Howard S. Becker (Outsiders, 1963) and later Stanley Cohen (Folk Devils and Moral Panics, 1972) describe how “moral entrepreneurs” deliberately elevate certain issues to define deviance and rally supporters.

   • Lobbyists, activists, or political leaders might selectively inflate taboos around abortion or homosexuality because these issues emotionally mobilize a base—whereas challenging corrupt corporate practices may be less appealing or profitable.

4. Economic Utility vs. Symbolic Utility

   • Taboos around corruption, consorting with criminals, or corporate welfare can fade if undermining them conflicts with powerful economic interests. By contrast, condemning abortion or homosexuality often has low or ambiguous economic cost, but high symbolic value for conservative or religious groups.

   • Thus, the “logic” behind these inconsistencies can lie in cost-benefit calculations—both material and symbolic.

3. Examples Illustrating the Hidden Logic

1. Evangelical Politics in the U.S.

   • Many conservative evangelical groups support politicians who push anti-abortion and anti-LGBTQ+ agendas—even if those same politicians consort with ethically dubious figures or corporate backers. The moral energy focuses on sexual/family issues rather than financial or political ethics.

   • This dichotomy can strengthen group identity and political power, illustrating how moral fervor around certain taboos can overshadow others.

2. Global Shifts in Finance and Commerce

   • The shift away from strong taboos on usury or corporate handouts correlates with the rise of global capitalism, where investment, bailouts, and subsidies are normalized as “just business.”

   • Meanwhile, sexual and reproductive issues remain personal and visceral, making them potent rallying points for moral campaigns.

3. Authoritarian Contexts

   • In some authoritarian regimes, moral or religious taboos are selectively intensified (e.g., bans on homosexuality) as a tool to suppress dissent and control society. Meanwhile, the taboo on government corruption or nepotism is deliberately eroded, because it benefits the ruling elite.

   • The logic is quite clear: preserve taboos that keep citizens in line; weaken those that might restrain the powerful.

4. Why the Logic Feels Absurd (Yet Persists)

1. Competing Moral Narratives

   • In a pluralistic era, contradictory moral frameworks collide. One group’s moral crusade (e.g., “protecting the unborn”) can appear patently inconsistent with another group’s emphasis on social justice or anti-corruption.

   • Viewed externally, it looks absurd that society is lenient on corporate exploitation but harsh on personal freedoms. Internally, however, each group believes it is applying consistent values within its own narrative.

2. Emotional Salience

   • Topics like abortion and sexuality tap into deep emotional and religious symbolism, often making them “hot-button” issues. By contrast, corporate wrongdoing can seem abstract or technical.

   • Cognitive biases (like the “identifiable victim effect”) make personal or bodily topics more emotionally charged, fueling stronger taboos—even if other issues (like systemic corruption) arguably cause greater harm.

3. Sociopolitical and Media Ecosystem

   • Polarized media landscapes amplify certain moral panics—particularly around sexuality—because they generate strong engagement and loyalty.

   • In contrast, exposés on financial corruption, while occasionally sensational, often require deeper attention spans and do not readily galvanize a neat moral narrative of “us vs. them.”

5. Balancing or Challenging the Contradiction

1. Conscious Restructuring of Taboos

   • Some social critics propose a reevaluation: we might revive stricter norms (or “taboos”) against abuses of power—corporate or political—while tempering or eliminating those that police personal bodily autonomy.

   • Reference: Alasdair MacIntyre in After Virtue (1981) argues modern societies must rebuild a coherent moral ethos to avoid haphazard enforcement of values.

2. Humanizing “Out-Groups”

   • When it comes to abortion or LGBTQ+ rights, activists stress personal stories and dignity to counter taboos based on abstract moral panic. This approach aims to shift the emotional salience from fear to empathy.

   • Reference: Martha C. Nussbaum, From Disgust to Humanity (2010), on moving past visceral “disgust” in moral judgments.

3. Transparency and Accountability

   • To counter the weakening of taboos on corruption or unscrupulous business practices, some advocate for stronger legal frameworks (whistleblower protections, anti-lobbying measures, public finance reporting).

   • Where these reforms align with strong public will, new taboos against certain exploitative behaviors can gain traction.

Final Thoughts

Despite the apparent contradiction—relaxed attitudes toward once-stigmatized practices like corruption or criminal collusion, yet amplified condemnation of abortion and homosexuality—there is often a “hidden logic” if one looks at the power interests, emotional triggers, and group identities involved. Taboos are not static moral absolutes; they are dynamic social constructs, shaped by shifting alliances, economic imperatives, and the desire for cohesion within certain moral or political tribes.

Consequently, what appears absurd from one vantage point may be entirely rational for those whose political or cultural influence hinges on reinforcing specific taboos. A deeper grasp of this underlying logic can illuminate why such inconsistencies persist—and perhaps guide efforts to advocate for a more coherent and equitable moral framework.

Suggested Further Reading

1. Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912) – on how collective moral boundaries are shaped.

2. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (1975), The History of Sexuality (1976–84) – on power, social control, and the emergence of “deviance.”

3. René Girard, Violence and the Sacred (1972) – exploring scapegoating and collective tension.

4. Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics (1972) – how societies escalate certain issues into moral crises.

5. Howard Becker, Outsiders (1963) – on moral entrepreneurship and defining deviance.

6. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (1981) – critique of modern moral fragmentation and the search for coherent ethics.

7. Martha C. Nussbaum, From Disgust to Humanity (2010) – addressing moral disgust, particularly in sexuality contexts.

By examining these works, one can see how taboos reflect deeper power relations, emotional resonances, and cultural logics—revealing that even seemingly “absurd” contradictions in moral emphasis often serve specific social or political functions.

Why do so many people appear to be more concerned about the animal cruelty than the cruelty against the powerless human beings?

ChatGPT said:

Reasoned for a couple of seconds

Short Answer:
People sometimes appear more concerned about animal cruelty than cruelty against powerless human beings due to a combination of psychological, cultural, and social factors. In particular, animals are often viewed as innocent and blameless—evoking strong empathic responses—whereas human victims can be seen (rightly or wrongly) as more “complicated” or partly responsible for their situation. This disparity in empathy is further shaped by media portrayals, moral licensing, and societal narratives that can minimize or rationalize human suffering while spotlighting animal welfare. Below is a deeper look at these factors, supported by references in psychology and moral philosophy.

1. Perceptions of Innocence and Responsibility

1. Attribution of Blame

   • Humans often attribute blame or responsibility to other human beings more readily than to animals. A person in hardship might be perceived as having made “poor choices,” whereas an animal is seen as incapable of causing its own suffering.

   • Reference: Social Psychology (Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, various editions) discusses attribution theory—how people assess who or what is responsible for a misfortune.

2. Innocence and “Purity”

   • Animals, especially pets or charismatic wildlife, are often seen as pure or untainted, stirring protective instincts. This can overshadow empathy for human victims who are portrayed—fairly or not—as somehow “impure” or “at fault.”

   • Reference: Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind (2012) touches on how notions of purity and innocence can heighten moral emotions.

2. Empathy Triggers and Emotional Biases

1. Anthropomorphism and Emotional Resonance

   • Anthropomorphism (attributing human-like qualities to animals) can intensify emotional responses. People more readily empathize with creatures seen as adorable, vulnerable, or expressive—like puppies or kittens.

   • When it comes to humans in dire circumstances, the “out of sight, out of mind” effect or media depictions can lead to desensitization.

2. Identifiable Victim vs. Statistical Suffering

   • Individuals are more likely to donate or show concern when confronted with a single, vivid animal in pain rather than large-scale human suffering. This is related to the “identifiable victim effect.”

   • Reference: Deborah A. Small & George Loewenstein, “Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim: Altruism and Identifiability” in the Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (2003).

3. Empathy Saturation or Compassion Fatigue

   • Constant news about human suffering (wars, poverty, disasters) can lead to “compassion fatigue,” making it harder to sustain empathy for powerless people. Animal cruelty cases, by contrast, may stand out as less common or more stark in everyday contexts.

   • Reference: Charles R. Figley, Compassion Fatigue: Coping with Secondary Traumatic Stress Disorder in Those Who Treat the Traumatized (1995).

3. Moral Licensing and Social Narratives

1. Moral Licensing

   • Sometimes, showing concern for animals allows individuals to feel morally good, potentially overshadowing human rights issues that may be more complex or demand deeper systemic changes. By advocating for animals, a person can see themselves as compassionate without confronting harder social injustices.

   • Reference: Benoît Monin & Dale T. Miller, “Moral Credentials and the Expression of Prejudice,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (2001).

2. Societal and Cultural Framing

   • Advocacy campaigns for animals can be highly visible, using emotive imagery and simple narratives (e.g., “Stop dog abuse!”). Stories of human suffering—homelessness, migrant crises, systemic injustice—are often more entangled with political or socioeconomic complexities, which can discourage direct emotional engagement.

   • This discrepancy in framing can lead to stronger public outrage for certain animal cruelty cases than for ongoing human rights abuses.

4. In-Group/Out-Group Dynamics and Victim-Blaming

1. Seeing Other Humans as Potential Rivals

   • Interpersonal relationships can be entangled with status, prejudice, or competition, reducing empathy for fellow humans—especially if they belong to perceived “out-groups.”

   • Animals are rarely viewed as rivals; hence people may find it easier to unify around protecting them.

2. Victim-Blaming

   • Individuals may rationalize human suffering by invoking personal responsibility, labeling the powerless as “lazy,” “irresponsible,” or “undeserving.” This type of scapegoating or victim-blaming does not typically apply to animals.

   • Reference: Melvin J. Lerner, The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion (1980) discusses how people blame victims to preserve a sense of a just world.

5. Possible Correctives and Balances

1. Holistic Empathy Education

   • Some psychologists and educators propose teaching empathy that encompasses all sentient beings—both humans and animals—emphasizing interconnectedness rather than setting up an either/or choice.

   • Reference: Paul Bloom’s Against Empathy (2016) actually critiques unregulated empathy but suggests cultivating reasoned compassion for all sentient beings could be more equitable.

2. Systemic Awareness

   • Advocates argue that while helping animals is commendable, it’s also crucial to address systemic human issues (poverty, exploitation, lack of healthcare) that keep many people powerless. Framing cruelty as a broad moral failing—human or animal—can unite these concerns.

   • Human rights organizations increasingly collaborate with animal welfare groups to highlight that compassion should be universal, not siloed.

3. Media Responsibility

   • Encouraging more nuanced media coverage can prevent animal stories from overshadowing equally urgent human crises. Balanced reporting that connects human and animal welfare (e.g., factory farm conditions linked to worker exploitation) can bridge empathy gaps.

Conclusion

The apparent paradox—why some are more vocal about animal cruelty than the suffering of powerless humans—stems from multiple psychological and social mechanisms: the innocence factor attributed to animals, empathy biases (like the identifiable victim effect), victim-blaming of humans, and media framing that simplifies animal cruelty stories while complicating human suffering. Understanding these factors can help foster a more balanced, comprehensive moral concern—one that recognizes the suffering of all sentient beings without neglecting the injustices faced by powerless human individuals.

Further Reading

• Paul Bloom, Against Empathy: The Case for Rational Compassion (2016)

• Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion (2012)

• Melvin J. Lerner, The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion (1980)

• Martin Gilens, Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics of Antipoverty Policy (1999) (for insight into how narratives of blame shape empathy gaps for human victims)

• Deborah A. Small & George Loewenstein, “Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim” (2003) – on the identifiable victim effect

Collectively, these works illuminate the psychological roots of empathy distribution—and why it sometimes appears disproportionate or contradictory when comparing concern for animals to concern for oppressed or powerless humans.

o1

You said:

Are there any actual surveys about this disparity?

ChatGPT said:

**Reasoned about surveys on empathy disparities** for 6 seconds

While there is no single, definitive poll measuring whether people overall care more about animal cruelty than human suffering, several studies and surveys strongly suggest that, in certain contexts, many individuals do indeed express greater empathy or emotional concern for animals than for (some) human victims. Below are examples of relevant empirical work and data points that shed light on this disparity:

1. Empathy Studies Comparing Animals and Humans

a. Levin & Arluke (Northeastern University)

• Title/Source: Jack Levin and Arnold Arluke, “Are People More Disturbed by Dog or Human Suffering?” – Presented at the American Sociological Association (2013), and discussed in various sociological forums.

• Key Finding: In an experimental scenario, participants read fictional news accounts describing victims who were either a puppy, an adult dog, a human infant, or a 30-year-old adult human. Respondents reported higher empathy levels for the dog victims (puppy/adult dog) and for the human infant compared to the adult human.

• Interpretation: The perceived innocence of both the dogs and the infant played a major role; adult humans were more likely to be seen as potentially responsible for their plight, thereby eliciting less empathy.

b. Signal Detection of Distress in Animals vs. Humans

• General Pattern: Various psychology studies (e.g., involving “identifiable victim effect”) find that when an animal’s suffering is vividly depicted (a photo or story about a specific dog or cat), it can trigger strong emotional and empathic responses. Meanwhile, human suffering—especially on a large scale—can be psychologically “distanced” or rationalized.

• References: Deborah A. Small & George Loewenstein, “Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim: Altruism and Identifiability,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (2003); also see work on anthropomorphism (Epley, Waytz & Cacioppo, 2007).

2. Charitable Giving and Opinion Polls

a. Trends in Animal vs. Human Charities

• Donations: Although far more total money goes to human-focused charities than animal charities (simply because of the breadth of human services), small-scale polls sometimes show that people will spontaneously donate to an animal rescue case more quickly than to a vaguely described human cause—if both are presented side by side in a lab or online scenario.

• Caution: Overall philanthropic data can be misleading because large institutional donors fund human charities on a massive scale. However, certain individual-level donation experiments have found that a single abused animal can attract more immediate sympathy than an abstract group of needy humans.

b. ASPCA Surveys and Public Opinion

• Organizations such as the ASPCA and Humane Society periodically conduct opinion polls indicating broad public concern for animal welfare—often extremely high percentages of respondents agree that cruelty to animals is morally unacceptable.

• By contrast, public concern for certain human-rights issues can be more nuanced or polarized (e.g., attitudes toward homeless individuals, drug users, or undocumented migrants). This does not mean people categorically care less about humans, but it does show that universal condemnation of animal cruelty often crosses ideological lines more easily than complex human social issues do.

3. Reasons Behind the Disparity (as Reflected in Surveys)

1. Perceived Innocence:

   • Surveys frequently show that respondents see animals—especially pets—as incapable of causing their own problems, whereas human victims might be partly blamed (“They made poor choices,” “They got themselves into that situation,” etc.).

2. Emotional Triggers and Anthropomorphism:

   • Many poll questions about animal cruelty involve vivid imagery or personal stories, thus generating immediate empathic responses. In contrast, human suffering is often presented in large-scale or politicized terms, dampening empathy.

3. Media Portrayals and Moral Simplification:

   • Survey participants may react strongly to single-issue campaigns (e.g., “Stop puppy mills!”) because the moral lines appear clearer compared to multi-layered human crises that involve social, political, or economic debates.

4. Caveats and Ongoing Research

• Context Matters: Not all studies reach the same conclusion, and empathy can shift dramatically depending on how questions are framed. Some research finds that people overall do care more about human issues—if those issues are clearly personalized (e.g., a single child in distress).

• Large-Scale vs. Anecdotal Suffering: In issues like war, famine, or homelessness, the suffering is often so vast and complex that respondents experience “compassion fatigue.” Animal-cruelty scenarios, by contrast, may be more bite-sized and emotionally digestible.

• Moral Consistency vs. Mixed Motivations: Many people care about both animal welfare and human rights, but different psychological triggers (innocence, blame, moral complexity) can affect how strongly or quickly they respond in each domain.

In Sum

While there is no single, nationwide (or worldwide) “poll” explicitly asking, “Do you care more about animals or humans?” a body of experimental and survey research shows that, in specific contexts, participants do express greater empathy or concern for animal cruelty than for human suffering—particularly when the human suffering is presented as abstract, large-scale, or potentially “self-inflicted.” The studies by Jack Levin and Arnold Arluke are among the most commonly cited in this regard, showing that perceived innocence plays a substantial role in shaping empathy levels.

Additional References

• Jack Levin & Arnold Arluke (2013). “Are People More Disturbed by Dog or Human Suffering?” – Data discussed at ASA conference and in sociological forums.

• Deborah A. Small & George Loewenstein (2003). “Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim: Altruism and Identifiability,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty.

• Epley, Waytz & Cacioppo (2007). “On seeing human: A three-factor theory of anthropomorphism,” Psychological Review.

• Stanley Cohen (1972). Folk Devils and Moral Panics – while not specifically about animals, explores how society fixates on certain moral transgressions more than others.

• Melvin J. Lerner (1980). The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion – on victim-blaming mindsets.

Taken together, these sources confirm that actual survey and experimental data do exist demonstrating an empathy gap favoring animals in certain scenarios—even if, at the societal level, huge resources also go toward addressing human suffering. The disparity is both a fascinating and sometimes troubling indication of how moral perception, blame attribution, and emotional triggers shape our compassion.

o1

You said:

Are there anyone who find this disparity absurd, instead of being just concerning or disturbing?

ChatGPT said:

Reasoned for 5 seconds

Short Answer:
Yes—many people do indeed find it absurd (not merely concerning) that society can display such strong empathy for animals while ignoring or downplaying cruelty against powerless humans. While formal academic studies often describe this phenomenon as “concerning,” “disturbing,” or “paradoxical,” a variety of social critics, philosophers, essayists, and even comedians have highlighted the absurdity of caring more for a puppy than for a suffering child or marginalized adult. Below are a few examples and references indicating that the word “absurd” or similarly charged language is sometimes used to describe this empathy gap.

1. Philosophical and Literary Voices

1. Albert Camus’s Concept of the Absurd (General, Not Specific to Animals/Humans)

   • Primary Text: Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus (1942).

   • Why Relevant: Camus describes the absurd as a feeling of dissonance arising when human expectations clash with reality. While he does not specifically analyze animal vs. human empathy, modern interpreters have used his framework to label certain moral double standards “absurd” in the Camusian sense.

   • Illustration: An individual or society that trumpets compassion for animals while tolerating severe injustice against other humans epitomizes a stark moral dissonance—what some might call “Camusian absurdity.”

2. Moral Satire in George Orwell

   • Relevant Work: Animal Farm (1945).

   • Note: Orwell’s novella is an allegory about power rather than a direct commentary on humans caring more for animals. Yet, the anthropomorphized injustices among farm animals ironically mirror real human tyrannies. Some critics note that Orwell’s depiction hints at the absurdity of how we can empathize with fictional animals but remain numb to real human oppression.

3. Jonathan Swift and the Irony of Priorities

   • Key Text: “A Modest Proposal” (1729).

   • Context: Although Swift doesn’t discuss animal welfare, his satirical essay uses absurd reasoning (eating Irish children) to expose society’s hypocrisy and callousness toward human suffering. Swift’s method is often evoked when modern writers highlight similarly stark, “absurd” contrasts—like fussing over a stray dog while ignoring starving families.

2. Satirical and Cultural Commentary

1. Comedians Highlighting the Irony

   • Stand-up comedians such as George Carlin, Bill Burr, or Ricky Gervais have riffs on how people lavish love on pets (or become outraged over specific cases of animal abuse) but remain indifferent to large-scale human tragedies.

   • The comedic framing typically points out the absurd gap—how rationally inconsistent or morally contradictory it seems to be outraged over a single harmed kitten but shrug at systemic injustices like homelessness or war.

2. Contemporary Journalistic or Online Commentary

   • Outlets like The Onion or Cracked have published satirical pieces depicting individuals who weep over animal cruelty videos online but ignore human atrocities.

   • These articles often explicitly label the disparity “absurd,” underscoring the jarring mismatch in moral priorities.

3. Essays and Opinion Pieces Calling It “Absurd”

1. Social Critics and Columnists

   • On occasion, columnists in major newspapers (e.g., The Guardian, The New York Times) pen op-eds explicitly using terms like “absurd,” “ironic,” or “incoherent” to describe societies that pass stringent animal-protection legislation yet fail to protect marginalized humans (e.g., refugees, the homeless).

   • While the language “absurd” is not always the formal scholarly term, it appears often in op-eds and public discourse.

2. Animal Rights vs. Human Rights Perspectives

   • Certain critics within human rights activism occasionally argue that it is absurd to champion new anti-cruelty measures for animals while ignoring, for instance, exploitative labor conditions that harm the world’s poorest populations. Their viewpoint emphasizes the contradictory moral calculus at play.

4. Reasons Critics Call It “Absurd”

1. Moral Inconsistency

   • The heart of “absurdity” here is the rational inconsistency: caring profoundly about an abused dog while overlooking a starving neighbor or victim of trafficking.

   • From a purely utilitarian or consequentialist perspective, it can appear irrational to direct large emotional or financial resources toward an animal while minimal help goes to nearby humans who suffer equally or more.

2. Cognitive and Emotional Biases

   • The comedic or critical use of “absurd” often points to the cognitive dissonance or identifiable victim effect (we empathize more with a single, cute dog than with many suffering humans). Observers find this mismatch so stark that “absurd” becomes the apt descriptor.

   • In a Camusian sense, they highlight a tension between professed values (e.g., “We should help the most vulnerable”) and actual behavior.

3. Existential or Philosophical Disillusionment

   • Some who adopt an existential lens see this as a microcosm of the broader “Absurd”—a world where moral reason and emotional sentiment do not align. The mismatch is so profound, it provokes a sense of absurdity rather than mere disapproval.

5. Further Reading

• Jack Levin and Arnold Arluke: While their research is more empirical (“Are People More Disturbed by Dog or Human Suffering?”), they have commented in interviews that the findings can feel “baffling” or “strange”—akin to an absurd moral gap.

• Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus (1942): For a general framework on the sense of the absurd when ideals crash against reality.

• Jonathan Swift, “A Modest Proposal” (1729): Classic satire that exaggerates moral priorities to highlight absurd neglect of real human suffering.

• Martha C. Nussbaum, From Disgust to Humanity (2010): Though it focuses on sexuality and legal frameworks, Nussbaum sometimes describes moral contradictions in ways that could be called absurd.

• Comedic Routines: Searching specifically for comedic bits by George Carlin, Bill Burr, or Ricky Gervais on “human vs. animal empathy” often yields direct comedic commentary labeling the phenomenon as ridiculous or “absurd.”

Conclusion

While many academic or advocacy works describe the empathy gap for animals over certain humans as “concerning,” “paradoxical,” or “problematic,” there are indeed commentators, critics, and comedians who go further—explicitly calling it absurd. This language typically appears in philosophical reflections on moral dissonance (inspired by Camus’s “absurd”), in satirical pieces meant to shock readers into reconsidering their priorities (Swiftian tradition), or in comedic routines that thrive on highlighting glaring inconsistencies. So, yes: if one looks beyond strictly scholarly phrasing, there is definitely a segment of public discourse where this disparity is called out not just as disturbing, but as outright absurd.

2/2

o1

You said:

In this case, if we consider the cost of commitment to change the situation might explain the surface disparity. Many people simply feel powerless to make a difference in cases of extensive human suffering.

ChatGPT said:

Reasoned for a couple of seconds

Yes—perceived efficacy and the cost of commitment can indeed help explain why people may focus more on animal cruelty than on widespread human suffering. When a problem (such as systemic poverty, human trafficking, or refugee crises) seems overwhelming, individuals often feel that their personal actions won’t make a tangible difference. By contrast, donating to an animal shelter, adopting a rescue pet, or supporting an anti-cruelty campaign can feel more immediately achievable and effective, making it psychologically appealing. Below are some key points and references that illuminate this phenomenon:

1. Perceived Efficacy and “Cost of Commitment”

1. Complexity of Human Suffering

   • Systemic issues like poverty or conflicts have no quick fixes; they demand large-scale policy changes, sustained social services, or political negotiations. An individual who donates a few dollars or volunteers occasionally may doubt their impact, potentially leading to a sense of learned helplessness.

   • Reference: Seligman, M. E. P. (1975). Helplessness: On Depression, Development, and Death.

2. Simplicity of Animal Interventions

   • Supporting animal welfare can seem simpler: rescue operations, spay/neuter programs, or adoption drives have fairly clear, actionable steps. People see quick, tangible outcomes: an abused dog gets medical care; a stray cat finds a home. The emotional reward is immediate and visibly real.

3. Psychological Rewards

   • Because helping animals can yield a direct “success story,” it provides an instant sense of accomplishment. In contrast, tackling a massive human-rights issue can feel like a drop in the ocean, reducing motivation or triggering compassion fatigue.

   • Reference: Figley, C. R. (Ed.). (1995). Compassion Fatigue: Coping with Secondary Traumatic Stress Disorder in Those Who Treat the Traumatized.

2. “Cost of Commitment” in Moral Choices

1. Resource Allocation

   • People often weigh how much money, time, or energy they can commit to a cause. Supporting an animal rescue may appear more manageable than, say, advocating for comprehensive healthcare reform or rebuilding war-torn areas.

   • Psychologically, individuals may feel they get a “better return on investment” by saving a single dog than by contributing to a vast, intractable social problem.

2. Minimal Perceived Threat to One’s Lifestyle

   • Major human issues frequently touch on deeper socio-political structures: addressing them can entail confronting one’s own privilege, taxes, or consumption patterns. This involves high personal or political cost.

   • Animal-focused charity can avoid entangling personal habits or policy. It rarely challenges the status quo (unless it’s about factory farming or other systemic practices), making it feel “safer” to support.

3. Psychological Theories That Underscore This Disparity

1. “Identifiable Victim” and Feasibility

   • Researchers such as Deborah Small and George Loewenstein found that individuals are more likely to help when a victim is clearly identified and the solution is straightforward.

   • Reference: Small, D. A., & Loewenstein, G. (2003). “Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim: Altruism and Identifiability.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty.

2. Moral Licensing

   • Contributing to an animal cause can provide a quick moral “win,” potentially reducing guilt or the feeling of obligation to tackle more complicated human issues. This is sometimes framed as moral licensing—doing something good in one domain can unconsciously diminish motivation to address other moral issues.

   • Reference: Monin, B., & Miller, D. T. (2001). “Moral Credentials and the Expression of Prejudice.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.

3. Empathy vs. Compassion Fatigue

   • Large-scale human suffering—poverty, refugee crises, systemic racism—can overwhelm individuals, leading to psychological shutdown or indifference. Animal-focused issues, often localized or individually framed, circumvent that sense of scale-induced despair.

4. Balancing Action and Awareness

1. Combining Approaches

   • Some advocacy groups bridge animal welfare and human rights—showing, for example, how workers in factory farms also face abuse. By linking these causes, individuals may see a more holistic way to make a difference without feeling powerless.

   • Example: Organizations that connect better livestock treatment with better labor conditions, thereby addressing both human and animal welfare in one framework.

2. Empowerment Through Smaller, Concrete Steps

   • Even complex human-rights issues can be broken into smaller, actionable targets (e.g., direct local charity, sponsoring a refugee family, grassroots organizing). Highlighting “small wins” can reduce perceived helplessness.

   • This approach mirrors the direct, tangible success people find so rewarding in animal rescues.

3. Public Policy and Collective Action

   • Ultimately, sustained systemic change—whether for animals or humans—often requires policy reform and social movements. Encouraging people to see their individual actions as part of a collective effort can help offset feelings of powerlessness.

Final Reflections

The disparity in empathy between animals and powerless human beings can stem, in part, from a sense of helplessness in the face of large-scale human suffering. When the cost of commitment (time, money, emotional investment) seems daunting, people may channel their compassion into areas where they perceive a feasible and rewarding impact—such as donating to an animal shelter or rescuing a stray. Recognizing this psychological dynamic isn’t to dismiss genuine concern for animals, but rather to highlight how structural factors and feelings of efficacy shape our moral priorities. By understanding the role of perceived powerlessness and high-stakes commitment, we can work toward strategies—like smaller, localized interventions—that make human-focused causes feel more tractable and personally meaningful.

Selected References

• Martin Seligman, Helplessness: On Depression, Development, and Death (1975) – on learned helplessness and human motivation.

• Charles R. Figley (Ed.), Compassion Fatigue (1995) – on emotional fatigue in caretakers and advocates.

• Deborah A. Small & George Loewenstein, “Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim” (2003) – on the identifiable victim effect.

• Benoît Monin & Dale T. Miller, “Moral Credentials and the Expression of Prejudice” (2001) – moral licensing.

These sources illuminate how practicality, emotional rewards, and perceived efficacy converge to shape where compassion gets directed, sometimes leading to the surprising contrast in attitudes toward animal versus human suffering.

o1

You said:

Is it possible that those who find the disparity absurd actually have an exaggerated sense of self-importance?

ChatGPT said:

## Reasoned about self-importance and empathy for 5 seconds

Short Answer:
Yes, it’s possible that some individuals who decry the disparity—finding it “absurd” that people care more about animal cruelty than human suffering—may do so partly out of a heightened sense of their own moral insight or superiority. However, it would be overly simplistic to conclude that all who voice this criticism have an inflated sense of self-importance. As in most moral discussions, motives are mixed: some people might indeed be engaging in moral grandstanding or self-aggrandizement, while others genuinely see the disparity as ethically inconsistent and want to highlight structural or psychological biases.

Below is a more detailed look at why this claim might arise, how it could be partly true in some cases, and what nuances are involved.

1. Moral Grandstanding and Self-Importance

1. Definition of Moral Grandstanding

   • Philosophers Justin Tosi and Brandon Warmke define moral grandstanding as the use of moral talk (publicly expressing outrage, condemnation, etc.) primarily to showcase one’s own moral virtue or superiority.

   • Reference: Tosi, J. & Warmke, B. (2020). Grandstanding: The Use and Abuse of Moral Talk. Oxford University Press.

2. Possible Links to the “Absurd” Critique

   • Someone who repeatedly calls it absurd that people care more about animals than impoverished or marginalized humans might be partly driven by a desire to signal an enlightened moral perspective—“Look at how clearly I see the hypocrisy!”

   • If the criticism becomes more about performing outrage than about addressing root causes, it can reflect an inflated sense of personal righteousness.

3. Overgeneralization Risk

   • Not everyone who points out a troubling or paradoxical moral disparity is doing so out of vanity or narcissism. Many sincerely want to draw attention to neglected human suffering.

   • Hence, labeling all critics of the disparity as self-important would be unfair. There’s a spectrum of motivation.

2. Psychological Factors That May Inflame Self-Importance

1. Social Media and Echo Chambers

   • Online platforms can amplify moral outrage, encouraging “performative” concern. Individuals may earn likes, retweets, or social capital by presenting themselves as outraged about “absurd” moral inconsistencies—potentially inflating their sense of moral authority.

   • Reference: Sunstein, C. R. (2017). #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media.

2. Narcissism of Small Differences

   • Sigmund Freud introduced the concept of the “narcissism of small differences,” where people in close proximity or with similar values highlight minor distinctions to assert moral or intellectual superiority.

   • Someone who already identifies strongly as an empathetic or justice-oriented person might “double down” on calling out the absurdity to differentiate themselves from those with “lesser” moral clarity.

3. Moral Licensing / Credentialing

   • Some folks use strong moral pronouncements (e.g., “It’s absurd to care more for animals than for starving children!”) to license themselves as inherently virtuous. This can paradoxically allow them to avoid deeper engagement with the human suffering they’re criticizing.

   • Reference: Monin, B. & Miller, D. T. (2001). “Moral Credentials and the Expression of Prejudice.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.

3. Nuances and Counterpoints

1. Legitimate Concern vs. Ego-Driven Outrage

   • Many critics of the animal/human empathy gap highlight real systemic or cognitive biases—like victim-blaming, learned helplessness, and compassion fatigue. Calling it “absurd” can simply be an expression of genuine frustration at moral inconsistency.

   • Sincerely seeking to reduce human suffering often involves highlighting the ways in which society’s priorities are skewed.

2. Absurdity as a Philosophical or Rhetorical Tool

   • Some people use the term “absurd” in a Camusian sense: pointing out the tension between moral ideals and real-world behavior. This rhetorical stance need not come from arrogance; it can stem from existential dismay or heartbreak.

   • Reference: Camus, A. (1942). The Myth of Sisyphus.

3. Importance of Collective Action

   • Even if individuals who raise this concern occasionally show signs of self-importance, that doesn’t negate the broader moral question. Systemic changes (e.g., improved welfare, social services) may still require public awareness—even if some of that awareness is voiced in a self-serving way.

4. Distinguishing Genuine Engagement from Performative Outrage

1. Depth of Involvement

   • One way to gauge motive is to see if the critic also takes action or proposes solutions—volunteering, donating, advocating policy changes—rather than merely denouncing the “absurdity” online.

   • If moral outrage is accompanied by sustained effort, it’s less likely to be purely about self-aggrandizement.

2. Openness to Dialogue vs. One-Upmanship

   • Those genuinely seeking change usually welcome discussion, data, and alternative views. Those driven mainly by self-importance or moral grandstanding might react defensively if questioned and prefer rhetorical “mic drops” to constructive dialogue.

3. Consistency Across Issues

   • Another marker is consistency: does the person also acknowledge complexities, empathize with well-intentioned animal advocates, or demonstrate nuanced understanding of how empathy is distributed? Or do they only highlight certain moral failings to demean others and bolster their own standing?

Conclusion

It is possible—even likely—that some individuals who loudly decry the disparity (that society at large cares more about animal cruelty than about powerless human suffering) are partly motivated by an inflated sense of moral clarity or self-importance. The phenomenon of moral grandstanding offers a plausible explanation for why certain voices might label it “absurd” in a way that suggests they alone see the “truth.”

However, one should be cautious not to generalize. Many people calling attention to this empathy gap do so out of a sincere desire to rectify what they see as a genuine moral inconsistency. As with most social and ethical debates, motivations are mixed: some participants indeed seek moral or social validation, while others passionately advocate for rebalancing compassion in favor of neglected human crises. The presence of a few self-important voices doesn’t invalidate the broader point that a noticeable empathy gap may exist and can warrant sincere concern or critique.

Suggested References

• Justin Tosi & Brandon Warmke, Grandstanding: The Use and Abuse of Moral Talk (2020) – on moral grandstanding and self-promotion via moral outrage.

• Camus, Albert, The Myth of Sisyphus (1942) – discussing the concept of “the Absurd” as a disconnect between ideals and reality.

• Monin, B. & Miller, D. T. (2001). “Moral Credentials and the Expression of Prejudice.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. – on how moral self-congratulation can reduce further moral effort.

• Freud, Sigmund, “The Narcissism of Small Differences” (1929/1930) – though brief, it’s relevant to subtle moral or social superiority displays.

• Cass Sunstein, #Republic (2017) – on how social media and echo chambers can amplify moral outrage (sometimes for performative reasons).

These sources help illustrate how moral judgments, self-importance, and public displays of outrage can intersect—while also acknowledging that genuine moral commitment often coexists with more self-serving motives.

o1

You said:

Frankly, I am all for the empowering of ordinary people to feel enough self-importance to engage in political affairs to find the current situation absurd.

ChatGPT said:

**Reasoned about empowering political engagement** for a couple of seconds

Absolutely—fostering a healthy sense of self-worth can be crucial for democratic engagement. When individuals feel that their voices matter, they’re more likely to speak up about injustices, question the status quo, and organize collectively. Below are a few reasons why “feeling enough self-importance” (or self-efficacy) can be a positive force in politics, along with ways to cultivate it in a balanced manner:

1. Self-Importance vs. Self-Efficacy

1. Distinction between Grandiosity and Empowerment

   • While moral grandstanding or narcissism can be detrimental, a baseline belief in one’s own ability to effect change—often called self-efficacy—is indispensable for civic life.

   • Reference: Albert Bandura’s work on self-efficacy (e.g., Self-Efficacy: The Exercise of Control, 1997) explains how people’s beliefs in their capacity to take action directly shape whether they engage or withdraw.

2. Overcoming Learned Helplessness

   • Martin Seligman’s theory of learned helplessness (1975) shows how repeated failures or systemic barriers can cause individuals to “give up,” believing their actions don’t matter. Encouraging a sense of self-importance (or personal agency) is an antidote to that despair.

2. Why Self-Importance Matters for Political Engagement

1. Motivation to Participate

   • People who feel they can make a difference are more likely to vote, attend town halls, protest, or run for local office. Cynicism or low self-esteem typically leads to political apathy.

   • Example: Grassroots movements—such as community-led environmental campaigns or school board activism—often begin with ordinary people realizing, “I can make a difference.”

2. Challenging Power Structures

   • If ordinary citizens don’t believe in their own moral or intellectual authority, they’re less inclined to stand up to entrenched interests. A measure of self-assuredness helps individuals question policies, confront officials, and demand accountability.

   • Reference: Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1970) underscores that believing in one’s own capacity for critical thought is foundational to challenging unjust systems.

3. Building Coalitions and Social Movements

   • Empowered people often inspire others. One person’s sense of self-worth can spark a neighborhood initiative, which can grow into a broader coalition. Collective self-importance—tempered by humility—is a vital catalyst for sustained political action.

3. Avoiding Pitfalls: Balancing Self-Importance with Collective Responsibility

1. From “I Matter” to “We Matter”

   • A healthy civic culture shifts from personal empowerment (“I can do something!”) to collective empowerment (“We can do something!”). This helps mitigate ego-driven pitfalls, ensuring that confidence fuels cooperation rather than competition.

   • Reference: Elinor Ostrom’s research (e.g., Governing the Commons, 1990) illustrates how shared responsibility emerges when individuals believe their contributions count and they coordinate with others.

2. Staying Informed and Open to Critique

   • If a person’s self-importance escalates into believing they’re always right, it can lead to dogmatism. Balancing confidence with openness—listening to diverse perspectives and data—makes political engagement more constructive.

   • Genuine empowerment includes being willing to learn, adapt, and sometimes acknowledge mistakes.

3. Constructive Outrage vs. Performative Outrage

   • Feeling “absurdity” in the status quo can motivate real action. However, repeatedly denouncing problems without practical follow-through might devolve into performative outrage. The goal is to channel that sense of “This is unacceptable!” into tangible organizing or policy advocacy.

4. Practical Ways to Cultivate Empowered Engagement

1. Local Civic Involvement

   • Encouraging people to engage in accessible, local-level politics (community boards, neighborhood associations, school committees) provides immediate feedback loops—successes and visible changes that reinforce self-efficacy.

2. Participatory Education

   • Civic education that includes role-play debates, model UN conferences, or student councils helps individuals practice leadership early, internalizing that their actions matter.

3. Mentorship and Peer Support

   • Connecting with like-minded advocates—online or locally—magnifies individual empowerment. Mentors who have turned frustration into impact can show newcomers that “absurdity” can be challenged effectively.

Final Thoughts

Empowering ordinary people to see themselves as capable of effecting change is essential for a vibrant democracy. A bit of self-importance—interpreted as confidence in one’s moral and intellectual agency—can indeed help individuals name the “absurdities” around them and take meaningful action. The key is striking a balance where one’s self-assuredness fuels collective engagement, rather than lapsing into self-centered grandstanding.

In this sense, your stance—to “be all for the empowering of ordinary people” to feel sufficiently important—is well-aligned with many theories of democratic participation. By nurturing a sense of personal efficacy, we may see more people calling out systemic injustices and organizing solutions, thus transforming outraged observation into sustained civic progress.

Recommended Resources

• Albert Bandura, Self-Efficacy: The Exercise of Control (1997) – foundational research on how belief in one’s capacity changes behavior.

• Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1970) – on the critical consciousness essential for oppressed or marginalized groups to claim agency.

• Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons (1990) – explores how collective action emerges when individuals trust their contributions have tangible impact.

• Justin Tosi & Brandon Warmke, Grandstanding: The Use and Abuse of Moral Talk (2020) – for cautionary perspectives on moral displays.

These texts collectively show the importance of personal empowerment in political life and the nuanced ways it can spur constructive action—or turn into counterproductive egoism. By championing self-importance that drives empathy and reform, we can foster healthier civic engagement that addresses the very absurdities you highlight.

o1

You said:

It appears that saying "your vote matters" is not enough. We might as well try to convince ordinary people that the situation is "absurd" enough even for them to be concerned. They really need to say to themselves "this is ridiculous, even I need to do something about it."

ChatGPT said:

Reasoned for a few seconds

Short Answer:
You’re right—simply insisting “your vote matters” often fails to stir people who feel powerless or jaded. Emphasizing the absurdity or ridiculousness of a situation can be more emotionally resonant, prompting individuals to say, “This is so outrageous, even I have to do something.” In other words, moral or existential shock—coupled with a sense of personal agency—can galvanize ordinary citizens better than abstract appeals to civic duty. Below is an overview of why framing issues as “absurd” can be effective and how to balance that shock factor with constructive engagement.

1. Why “Absurdity” Can Spark Action

1. Emotional Jolt and Cognitive Dissonance

   • When people encounter a stark disconnect between values (e.g., fairness, decency) and reality, highlighting the situation as absurd can trigger a moment of clarity or outrage.

   • Reference: Leon Festinger’s A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (1957). Festinger describes how mental discomfort can motivate people to reduce the gap between beliefs and conditions. Calling something “ridiculous” or “absurd” can amplify that discomfort in a productive way.

2. Existential Urgency

   • Albert Camus uses “the Absurd” to describe the clash between our desire for meaning and the universe’s apparent indifference. Translating this idea to politics, pointing out glaring hypocrisy or irrational policies can lead people to a similar absurd realization—fueling a desire to restore coherence.

   • Reference: Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus (1942).

3. Humor and Satire

   • Satire often highlights the ridiculous to rally public opinion—think of The Daily Show, Last Week Tonight, or historically, Jonathan Swift’s A Modest Proposal. By mocking the status quo as ridiculous, satire spurs people’s sense of “We can’t let this stand.”

2. Moving Beyond “Your Vote Matters”

1. Overcoming Cynicism and Learned Helplessness

   • Many feel their single vote is negligible—especially in large-scale elections. They may be aware of gerrymandering, low competitive districts, or corporate influence. Simply telling them “your vote counts” can ring hollow when they see entrenched systems.

   • By contrast, hearing “this state of affairs is so outlandish that you have every reason to be outraged” frames engagement not as a minor duty, but as a moral imperative.

2. Converting Outrage into Agency

   • Persuasive messaging needs two components: (1) emotional spark—like naming an injustice as “absurd”—and (2) a pathway for action. People must see how their efforts (volunteering, protesting, running for local office, or even voting in strategic races) can reduce the absurdity.

   • Reference: Albert Bandura’s Self-Efficacy: The Exercise of Control (1997). Without a sense of efficacy, even outraged citizens can slump into despair.

3. Tapping into Moral Identity

   • Studies in moral psychology (e.g., by Jonathan Haidt) show that when people see an issue as a fundamental violation of fairness or care, they’re more likely to engage. Labeling certain conditions as “ridiculous” draws a moral line in the sand.

   • Reference: Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind (2012).

3. Balancing Shock with Constructive Pathways

1. Avoiding Despair or Pure Cynicism

   • If “absurdity” is pitched as unsolvable, it can breed nihilism: “Yes, it’s ridiculous, but we can’t fix it.” Instead, pairing the shock factor with clear, incremental solutions—like community organizing, local policy change, or targeted electoral strategies—helps people see tangible next steps.

   • Example: John Oliver’s segments often end with a call to action or highlight existing advocacy groups.

2. Sustaining Momentum

   • Outrage is a strong motivator but can fade quickly. Long-term engagement requires community building and repeated “wins”—even small ones—to keep morale high.

   • Reference: Saul Alinsky, Rules for Radicals (1971). Alinsky emphasizes that small, winnable battles help people remain committed and confident.

3. Including Diverse Voices

   • Encouraging a broad range of people—across socioeconomic, racial, and ideological lines—to share their “This is ridiculous!” moments fosters unity. If only certain demographics express outrage, others may not feel represented.

4. Practical Tips to Make “Absurdity” an Effective Rallying Cry

1. Use Specific, Vivid Examples

   • Focusing on a tangible case (e.g., a local corruption scandal or an egregiously outdated law) makes the “absurdity” concrete. Vague moralizing rarely hits home.

   • Integrate personal stories: “Look how this policy impacted my neighbor—that’s ridiculous.”

2. Offer Simple, Immediate Actions

   • Provide straightforward steps: sign a petition, attend a city council meeting, volunteer at a grassroots group. Empowering first steps sustain the impetus from moral shock.

3. Build a Collective Identity

   • Encourage language like “Even we need to do something about this” rather than “I alone must fix it.” A shared sense of purpose diminishes isolation and underscores that many see it as absurd—reducing the social stigma of speaking out.

4. Use Humor Strategically

   • Humor, especially satire, can defuse defensiveness in those who might otherwise tune out political messages. By highlighting the comedic aspects of a broken system, you can nudge folks from passive observation to “Yes, this is insane. Let’s fix it.”

Final Thoughts

Telling ordinary people “your vote matters” can come off as rote and ineffective, especially in an era of political disillusionment. Emphasizing the absurd or ridiculous nature of certain policies and injustices can pierce through apathy, igniting moral or existential urgency. When citizens declare, “This is so wrong that even I must act,” they tap into a blend of indignation, personal responsibility, and self-efficacy—arguably a stronger motivator than dutiful appeals to electoral participation.

The key is coupling that sense of the “absurd” with practical steps and a collective spirit, ensuring that outrage transitions into constructive civic engagement. With thoughtful framing and community-building, pointing out the ridiculous can become a powerful catalyst for real political change.

Suggested Readings

• Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus (1942) – for an existential take on the Absurd.

• Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (1957) – on how dissonance motivates change.

• Albert Bandura, Self-Efficacy: The Exercise of Control (1997) – highlights the link between belief in effectiveness and action.

• Saul Alinsky, Rules for Radicals (1971) – practical community organizing tips, including how to harness moral outrage productively.

• Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind (2012) – on the moral foundations that drive political engagement.

These works offer a mix of theoretical insight and pragmatic strategies for channeling the energy of “this is ridiculous!” into sustained political involvement.

o1

You said:

That's how I motivate myself to engage in philosophical and civic activity. Thanks.

ChatGPT said:

Reasoned for a second

I’m glad it resonates with you. Embracing a healthy level of exasperation or viewing certain injustices as “absurd” can indeed energize both philosophical thinking and civic engagement. When discontent spurs genuine curiosity, reflection, and action, it becomes a powerful catalyst for positive change. Best of luck in all your endeavors—and keep harnessing that sense of the absurd in constructive ways!

o1